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The role of intuition in judicial decisionmaking is in various
ways controversial. Consider the well-known invocation of
judicial intuition by Justice Potter Stewart in the obscenity case
of Jacobellis v. Ohio.1 Justice Stewart's brief concurring opinion
concluded:
[C]riminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to
hard-core pornography. I shall not today attempt further to
define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when
I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not
that.2
Many readers find this explicit and direct reliance on judicial
intuition3 to be startling, if not shocking.4 Justice Stewart's
opinion is said to imply that "some knowledge comes immediately
from seeing, not from deliberating,"5 and thus to emphasize"nonrational elements in judicial decisionmaking."6
The idea of intuition is also invoked literally in Justice
Holmes's account of the common law. Holmes famously writes,
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent
moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to
1. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The current basic test for obscenity
requires appeal to a prurient interest in sex and patent offensiveness according to
contemporary community standards, a lack of serious value of any of several specified
kinds, and a specific definition or illustration of proscribed conduct by state law. Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see also Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987)
(clarifying the role of community standards in the test for obscenity).
3. Justice Stewart, of course, does not refer explicitly to "intuition" itself. We will
see in Parts I and III that terms such as "intuition" and "intuitionism" can be used in
various ways. While it is tempting to say that we know an intuition when we see it, we
will make some choices among alternative understandings below, and Justice Stewart's
famous use will fall within the bounds of judicial intuition so understood.
4. See Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See It," 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1024 (1996)
(arguing that "[t]he shock derives totally from its location within a Supreme Court
opinion, since both its rhetoric and its content are so unusual in that context").
5. Id. Professor Gewirtz elsewhere refers to the implied limits to articulability, and
to the absence of any "conscious process of deduction." Id. at 1031.
6. Id. at 1023; see also id. at 1025-26. Of course, we should not simply assume that




do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which
men should be governed.'
We cannot be sure precisely how Holmes intends the term
"intuitions."8 In particular, we may wonder whether he means to
suggest that judicial intuitions can be only of "public policy." Can
there be other kinds of judicial intuitions? Can the "felt
necessities of the time" ° be intuited necessities? Can shared"prejudices"" take the form of intuitions? If "prevalent moral and
political theories"'2 are not themselves intuitions, can they
nonetheless be based on intuitions? Must such theories be based
on, or otherwise crucially depend on, intuition?
Some writers have urged that the role of intuition in moral
decisionmaking in general, 3 or in judicial decisionmaking in
particular,'4 is or should be limited. Whether that is desirable or
even possible we cannot yet say. We must think carefully about
intuition in moral and judicial thought.
First, we will consider how judicial opinions themselves
commonly regard intuitions." This brief sampling will establish
the ambivalence with which judges view the role of intuition in
the law. Second, we will seek to add further clarity and depth to
the judicial perspective by drawing upon the work of some of the
best technical philosophers to have discussed intuitions.'6 A
central focus will be on the varied critiques and defenses of
several forms of intuitionism as an approach to arriving at moral
truth. The themes of the pervasiveness and indispensability of
intuition, along with the possible dependence of intuition itself on
other forms of moral decisionmaking, will be raised.
7. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publ'ns 1991)
(1881) (emphasis added).
8. Some or all of the mental work in arriving at an intuition may be unconscious,
but on some definitions, the intuition itself might have to be conscious.




13. See, e.g., KURT BAIER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW: A RATIONAL BASIS OF ETHICS
123 (abr. ed., Random House 1965) (1958) ("I will now take it for granted that there is no
such thing as moral intuition or seeing by reason what is right and wrong."). Baier argues
that [ilt would ... be better to say that reason is the power to work out, rather than the
power to 'see,' the answers to certain questions." Id.
14. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 517, 524 (1998) ("Courts reason about rather than grasp intuitively to which
precedent cases the cases before them should be assimilated. Or at least they purport to
reason about this, which is why they write opinions that purport to describe their
reasoning.").
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
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These themes are then developed by specifically addressing
intuition and weighing and balancing in the law. We discuss
what are thought of as nonbalancing or priority-based judicial
decisionmaking tests. 7 We then consider decisionmaking theories
that seek to emphasize either logical inference, coherence among
one's beliefs, or the reliability of the method by which one's
conclusions were arrived at, as well as theories that emphasize
the use of analogy in judicial decisionmaking."8 We conclude by
linking judicial intuition to the practical decisionmaking virtues
of sound judgment, practical wisdom, or what is known as the
classic Greek idea of phronesis.9
As the discussion unfolds, we will emphasize the pervasive
and inescapable role of intuition, and the inescapable and crucial
dependence of each allegedly distinct alternative to intuition
upon intuition itself. We will not neglect, however, the ways in
which intuition in turn depends upon these same alternatives to
intuition in moral and judicial decisionmaking.
In particular, we must remember that appellate opinion
writers are typically not called upon simply to reach and boldly
announce a good legal result, or even to then solemnly assure us
they have done so. Courts often face the task of somehow publicly
and articulately defending, validating, or legitimizing their
judicial result." This demand is commonly imposed for various
reasons, including that of maintaining the stable authority of a
presumably sound adjudicatory system. This justificatory
process, too, will inevitably depend upon intuition, and the mere
reporting by the court of judicial intuitions that are not
articulately defensible cannot fulfill these public justificatory
functions. The judicial focus must then shift toward methods that
may reasonably persuade the reader, and even a disappointed
litigant, of the judge's comprehensiveness and sensitivity of
consideration and concern.2 '
In conclusion, intuition is invariably central-whether
overtly so or not-to the process of arriving at a judicial outcome
by any standard recognized means. But intuition is itself
typically dependent upon nonintuitionistic or less-centrally
intuitionistic techniques in arriving at, and publicly legitimizing,
the judicial outcome.
17. See infra Part M.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
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To return to our starting point, Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in Jacobellis,22 we can say that for Justice Stewart to
emphasize intuition in reaching his judicial result is in a sense
merely to recognize the inevitable. Intuition is inescapable. Other
supposedly distinct methods of reaching a judicial result, beyond
an unusually bare and direct appeal to intuition, will often be
more articulately defensible. If he had been pressed, Justice
Stewart could doubtlessly have identified and articulated some
particular aspects of the work in question that somehow
supported his legal conclusion. But it is important to appreciate
that the major alternatives to intuition in deciding Jacobellis
themselves inevitably depend crucially on some exercise of
intuition.
What is understandably disturbing to many of his readers is
not Justice Stewart's intuitionism itself, but intuitionism
unsupplemented and unadorned. Justice Stewart's opinion by
itself does not fulfill the judicial task of legitimizing his outcome
because he does not demonstrate that he has carefully and
sensitively considered the evidence and alternative case
holdings.23 In any event, we shall see that appreciating the
proper role of intuition in judicial decisionmaking is central to
understanding not only Justice Stewart's opinion, but any
standard judicial opinion.
II. WHAT DO THE CASE OPINIONS THEMSELVES SAY ABOUT
INTUITION?
In the course of their published opinions, judges commonly
explicitly refer to intuition or to some related idea. There is, of
course, no reason to believe that the judges are all using intuition
to mean the same thing. Nor do all judges use the term
"intuition" in rigorous, precisely defined senses. Many judges,
though, find themselves at least occasionally required to rely on
"instinct or experience," even in densely rule- and test-governed
areas of the law.24 Sometimes there is a sense that judicial
"intuition" and "feeling" can provide a personal but not fully
22. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Of course,
not all concurring or dissenting opinions are intended as independent, self-standing,
sufficient public justifications of any judicial result. The very brevity of Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion may suggest as much.
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380, 389 (9th Cir. 1996) (Tashima, J.,
concurring) (arguing that judges must sometimes rely on instinct or experience when
applying a strict scrutiny analysis in the context of the First Amendment and quoting
Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280, 305 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Rymer, J., dissenting)).
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articulable sort of knowledge," with some judicial intuitions
described as "sound."26
Thus, some courts speak of intuition-the sound instances
thereof-as valid, even if the intuition is itself the outcome of an
unexplainable process, and the intuition does not justify itself in
any publicly accessible fashion. Courts often vaguely link" or
even identify28 judicial intuition with the similarly humble idea of"common sense." 29
A possible linkage between intuition and common sense is
through the idea of obviousness. Some courts recognize certain
ideas, and even some conclusions, as "intuitively obvious. ', ° Of
course, courts also recognize that not all truths will be intuitively
obvious,"l whatever the overall relationship between intuition
25. See, e.g., Avery v. Sabbia, 704 N.E.2d 750, 755 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (approving
use of intuition and feeling in deciding what justice requires during discovery); see also
State v. King, 883 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc) ("The court intuitively recognizes
the potential deterrent value....").
26. See, e.g., Hassoon v. Shamieh, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 663 (Ct. App. 2001)
(stating "[wle believe the judicial intuition underlying the result. . . is sound"); People v.
Calderon, 283 Cal. Rptr. 833, 836 (Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that "[t]he transferred
intent doctrine is born of the sound judicial intuition that such a defendant is no less
culpable than a murderer whose aim is good'" (quoting People v. Birreuta, 208 Cal. Rptr.
635, 639 (Ct. App. 1984))).
27. See, e.g., Worthy v. U.S. Steel Corp., 507 F. Supp. 25, 28 (ED. Pa. 1980)
(observing that the determination of intent often "requires inference based in large part
on common sense and intuition").
28. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 87 F.3d 676, 681 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996) (asserting
that "our judicial intuition--or common sense-tells us that the result is foreordained").
The court immediately goes on to argue, interestingly, that "[o]ften in such situations it is
preferable to simply announce the conclusion, rather than to attempt to explicate its
doctrinal basis." Id. This raises the issue of the costs and benefits of reason-giving or
explanation in the law, which in turn affects the proper scope of more or less
unexplainable judicial intuition. See id. The court concludes, "Sometimes, however, the
latter exercise serves as [a] useful check on potentially erroneous or simply reflexive
intuition, particularly where some of the contextual principles appear to be in at least
moderate flux." Id. The roles of intuition and explanation, along with other ways of
indirectly legitimizing judicial decisions, are taken up and discussed further in Part IV.
29. See authorities cited and discussion supra notes 27-28.
30. See, e.g., Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. D.A.C., 710 So. 2d 1274, 1275 (Ala. Civ. App.
1998) (using specific case law to amplify or bolster an "'intuitively obvious" legal
proposition (quoting Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Fore, 785 F. Supp. 947, 948-49 (M.D. Ala.
1992))).
31. See, e.g., Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 20 S.W.3d 692, 705
(Tex. 2000) (Hecht, J., concurring) (stating that "it is not intuitively obvious" that a
"general rule' keeps down insurance costs").
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and truth." Sometimes judges see intuitions as forceful3 or
creative," if not as somehow inspired.35
But to the extent that courts have linked intuition with what
is commonsensical, obvious, truly "manifest,"36 or even just"evident,"" little creativity or inspiration would seem required.
Thinking of intuition as what is obviously or manifestly true
helps us appreciate how a court might refer to a particular
intuition as "virtually universal."38
Most interesting legal questions, however, do not have
manifest or obvious solutions. What the courts believe about any
relations among intuition, accumulated experience, and sound
judgment is therefore of great importance. On this question, the
courts recognize several possibilities. It has been said first that
"'the intuitions of courts derived from experience are sometimes
better than their reasoning."'39 Intuition has also been thought to
contribute along with experience to judicial reasoning, rather
than to contrast with judicial reasoning.0  Intuition and
experience are thus sometimes taken to be judicial allies.' The
32. See infra Part III.
33. See, e.g., Mannesmann-Sumerbank Boru Endustrisi T.A.S. v. United States, 86
F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1274 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999) (recognizing "the intuitive force of plaintiffs'
arguments"). Recognizing the intuitive force of an argument, of course, hardly commits
one to accepting that argument. An argument can clearly have intuitive force without
being persuasive or convincing.
34. See, e.g., N.Y. Bung & Bushing Co. v. Doelger, 23 F. 191, 193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1885)
(referring to "'that intuitive faculty of the mind put forth in the search for new results or
new methods, creating what had not before existed, or bringing to light what lay hidden
from vision'" (quoting Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 72 (1885))).
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Bremner v. Marc Eidlitz & Son, Inc., 174 A. 172, 174 (Conn. 1934)
(N[Elvident suggests something more of a mental process but no difficulty in seeing that
the thing is true; manifest is a degree stronger than evident, the mind getting the truth as
by an intuition."); Buckner v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 161 S.E.2d 319, 320-21 (Ga. Ct. App.
1968) (defining evident and manifest).
37. See supra note 36.
38. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 514 (N.J. 1998) (relying on "virtually
universal intuition").
39. Villanova Leasing Corp. v. L.M.J. Realty Corp., 226 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765 (Sup. Ct.
1962) (quoting Roscoe Pound, Causation, 67 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1957)).
40. See, e.g., State v. DiFrisco, 662 A.2d 442, 479 (N.J. 1995) (Handler, J.,
dissenting) ("[r]easoning from intuition and experience").
41. See, e.g., State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 220 (Tenn. 2000) ("'[We consider a
multitude of variables.., in light of the experienced judgment and intuition of the
members of this Court.'" (quoting State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773, 790 (Tenn. 1998)));
State v. Henderson, 24 S.W.3d 307, 315 (Tenn. 2000) (same); State v. Smith, 993 S.W.2d
6, 17-21 (Tenn. 1999) (noting that the court "rel[ies] also upon the experienced judgment
and intuition of [its] members" in a death penalty proportionality review).
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courts, however, do not always take intuition and experience to
be mutually supplementary in ordinary decisionmaking.42
In fact, more negatively, courts often link intuition to
subjectivity,43 where subjectivity is being contrasted unfavorably
with objectivity in decisionmaking." By itself, intuition in such
contexts is thought to be an inadequate basis for the legal
judgment in question.45 What some judges think that intuition
crucially lacks may vary. Beyond lack of objectivity, 6 reasoning
itself in a broader sense may be thought to be missing or
insufficient in cases of intuition.47 Intuition by itself may be
42. See, e.g., Evers v. Dollinger, 471 A.2d 405, 419 (N.J. 1984) (finding particular
item of knowledge within the medical community as "based on experience rather than
intuition").
43. See, e.g., State v. Martini, 651 A.2d 949, 997-1000 (N.J. 1994) (Handler, J.,
dissenting) (linking, at several points, intuition to mere subjectivity in criticizing death
penalty proportionality review and referring also to the judiciary's "unexplained intuitive
moral response[s]" to particular crimes).
44. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Farm Fresh, Inc., 966 F.2d 142, 145-46 (4th Cir. 1992)
(holding that "some stronger objective indicator... than simple judicial intuition is
needed to warrant the drastic step of disqualification of counsel"); Squires v. Squires, 854
S.W.2d 765, 775 (Ky. 1993) (Leibson, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the Majority
Opinion ... is more intuitive than objective"). But cf Pickens v. Children's Mercy Hosp.,
124 F.R.D. 209, 211 (W.D. Mo. 1989) ("Subjective and nearly intuitive fact-finding is
necessary in many cases, not least in reconstructing the 'truth' in discrimination cases,
and a plaintiff is entitled to hope for the best without a substantial amount of objective
proof of discrimination.").
45. See, e.g., Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 636-37 (1982) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("This reasoning has no basis in Illinois law and appears to derive from
nothing more than judicial intuition."); United States v. Johnson, 316 F.3d 818, 820 (8th
Cir. 2003) (Riley, J., dissenting) ("Judicial intuition is helpful, but intuition alone is not
enough to increase punishment. Proof is."); see also Rodriguez v. Colorado, 498 U.S. 1055,
1059 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Colorado Supreme Court's
"intuitive judgment" did not save constitutionally defective jury instructions); EEOC v.
S.S. Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 604 (1st Cir. 1995) (acknowledging that "'an
intuitive judicial judgment" may not be adequate "as the sole basis for discerning a
disparate impact" in employment decisions); Leverso v. S. Trust Bank, 18 F.3d 1527, 1534
(11th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the trial court's "intuitively equitable" rationale in favor of
"unambiguous contractual rights").
46. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Jimenez-
Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Reasonable suspicion can not rest upon the
hunch of an experienced officer, even if the hunch turns out right. The requirement of
objective fact to support an inference of wrongdoing eliminates the need to deal with a
police stop that rests on constitutional intuition.").
47. See, e.g., Lake Gibson Land Co. v. Lester, 102 So. 2d 833, 835-36 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1958) (explaining that the determination of the reasonableness of water use by
riparian proprietors "'is not and should not be an unreasoned, intuitive conclusion on the
part of the court or jury" but requires a "weighing'" of their conflicting interests (quoting
Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 135 (Ark. 1955))); State v. Pillar, 820 A.2d 1, 19 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (seeking "'less an exercise in judicial intuition, or second
guessing, and more of a reasoned application of a set of rules to a given fact pattern'"
(quoting Dennis J. Sweeney, An Analysis of Harmless Error in Washington: A Principled
Process, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 277, 282 (1995-1996))). It is not meant to suggest here that
intuition can be disentangled from judicial reasoning, particularly in the forms of judicial
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thought to be insufficiently analytic." Or intuition may be
thought by some judges to lack scientific support,49 to be without
sufficient empirical support,50 or simply to be unscientific.
5 1
Equally disturbing, and related to the above concerns, is the
judicial sense that intuitions are themselves unexplained 2 and
unarticulated 3 Intuitions thus may not help the courts explain
or articulate their reasoning process and the case outcome
through a traditional written opinion. And even a written
statement of an intuited outcome or principle may be thought to
be unfortunately vague in its scope. 4
When these apparent limitations of intuitionism in judicial
decisionmaking loom large, a court's approach to intuition can as
a result be dismissive. Intuition then becomes "naked intuition"
5
weighing and balancing.
48. See, e.g., Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949, 963 n.l (D. Md.
1977) (conceding that the court's own belief was arrived at "[a]dmittedly more intuitively
than analytically"); Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1128 (Wash.
1989) (en bane) (Utter, J., dissenting) (distinguishing "principled analysis" from a result
appearing to "spring from ... 'pure intuition').
49. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110, 1121-22 (Wyo. 1987) (Urbigkit, J.,
dissenting) (characterizing a "'simple intuition of courts'" concerning sex offender behavior
as having "little scientific support'" (quoting James M.H. Gregg, Other Acts of Sexual
Misbehavior and Perversion as Evidence in Prosecutions for Sexual Offenses, 6 ARIZ. L.
REV. 212, 236 (1965))); see also In re William S., 333 N.Y.S.2d 466, 472 (Fam. Ct. 1972)
(same).
50. See, e.g., Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 543 P.2d 1356, 1366 (Haw.
1975) (referring to an "intuitive finding" of specified judges "unaided by any empirical
evidence" of the effect of defamation suits on the news media's freedom of expression and
suggesting that the relevant empirical evidence would be better developed by legislatures
than by courts).
51. See, e.g., Tex. Steel Co. v. Recer, 508 S.W.2d 889, 899 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1974, writ refd n.r.e.) (characterizing an isolated, not broadly informed jury award
as "intuitional and unscientific").
52. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 53 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir.
1995) ("'Independent review.., does not admit of unreflective reliance on a lower court's
inarticulable intuitions. Thus, an appropriately respectful application of de novo review
should encourage a district court to explicate with care the basis for its legal conclusions.'"
(quoting Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991))).
53. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Haguewood, 638 P.2d 1135, 1138 (Or. 1981)
(concluding that "as long as equitable principles remain intuitive instead of articulated,
adjoining circuit courts may choose to apply different policies to similar cases"); State v.
Oxborrow, 723 P.2d 1123, 1133 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (stating that "[t]he length of an
exceptional sentence thus should now be based on articulated factors instead of
intuition").
54. E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("The problem with judicial intuition of a public policy that goes beyond
the actual prohibitions of the law is that there is no way of knowing whether the apparent
gaps in the law are intentional or inadvertent."); Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155,
174 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (contending that the "'precise acts' test ... in practice is
no test at all but an appeal to vague policy intuitions").
55. See, e.g., Watson v. State, 900 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc)
(Clinton, J., concurring) (arguing that the plurality relied upon "nothing more than its
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or "ipse dixit,""6 in which a court "consultts] its viscera."57 "Mere"58
intuition or "uninformed"59 intuition is sometimes reduced to a
more or less arbitrary "whim." ° In such moments, and at least
for some judges, the value of intuition in judicial decisionmaking
may seem minimal or even negative.
The judges themselves thus range from seeing intuitions as
valuable-if not essential-to a more neutral stance, to taking an
extremely critical view of intuitions. Given this collective
confusion, uncertainty, and disagreement, it may be helpful to
draw upon the work of the philosophers who have thought most
carefully, even if they in turn have in different ways disagreed,
about the role of intuition in decisionmaking.
III. DRAWING UPON WHAT THE PHILOSOPHERS HAVE SAID ABOUT
INTUITIONS
A. Some General Understandings
Judges, including the judges cited in Part II above, doubtless
intend most often some ordinary, familiar, nontechnical,
dictionary-guided meaning of the term "intuition." But our
understanding of the role of intuition in judicial
decisionmaking-both in actual judicial practice, and where
judicial intuition might be best justified-might well be enhanced
by drawing upon the work of those who have thought most
carefully about intuitions.
A number of respected modern philosophers have thought
carefully-both favorably and unfavorably-about intuitions,
especially in connection with a variety of philosophical positions
bound together by the name "intuitionism." Intuitionism covers
too diverse a range of positions to repay an exhaustive inventory.
But we may profit by drawing selectively from this more
technical literature.
naked intuition").
56. See id. (describing the plurality's opinion as "ipse dixit").
57. See id. ("I suspect that the plurality has once again consulted its viscera . ..
58. See, e.g., Gomes v. Fair, 738 F.2d 517, 525 (lst Cir. 1984) (supporting the trial
court's observation that prison officials cannot take actions against an inmate based on"mere 'intuition'" but reversing the trial court's injunction because there was evidence to
support the actions of the prison officials).
59. See, e.g., Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 679 n.4 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (referring to "the Court's uninformed intuition" about the degree of burden
imposed on the states by the rule adopted by the Court).
60. See, e.g., Ernst v. Roberts, 379 F.3d 373, 381 (6th Cir. 2004) ("The general
question of how to characterize a non-federal public entity has not been left to federal
courts' whim or intuition.").
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One entry into the philosophical mainstream "is the view
that one may legitimately appeal to one's moral intuitions in the
course of moral reasoning, even though these moral intuitions
are (by definition) not supported via inference from any other
judgments.""' The author of this formula goes on to specify that
intuitionism on his understanding "is not the view that we are
possessed of a mysterious sixth sense capable of detecting occult
moral particles."62
On a similar view, "a moral intuition is a spontaneous
judgment" 3 that "is not the result of conscious inferential
reasoning."64 Otherwise put,
the allegiance the intuition commands is not based on an
awareness of its relations to one's other beliefs. If one
considers the act of torturing the cat, one judges
immediately that, in the circumstances, this would be
wrong. One does not need to consult one's other beliefs in
order to arrive at this judgment.6'
This author goes on to clarify that "spontaneity" in this
sense "is entirely compatible with the possibility that a fair
amount of cognitive processing may be occurring beneath the
surface of consciousness. 66 As well, spontaneity of judgment does
61. Mark Nelson, Morally Serious Critics of Moral Intuitions, 12 RATIO 54, 54
(1999).
62. Id.; see also Mark Platts, Moral Reality, in ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM 282, 285
(Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988) ("[I~t is no part of this intuitionism to suggest that we
detect the moral aspects of a situation by means of some special faculty of the mind, the
intuition. We detect moral aspects of a situation in the same way we detect (nearly all)
other aspects: by looking and seeing."). The latter claim is often found controversial, if not
cryptic. For criticism, see, for example, J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS 41 (1977) ("It is not even
sufficient to postulate a faculty which 'sees' the wrongness: something must be postulated
which can see at once the natural features that constitute the cruelty, and the wrongness,
and the mysterious consequential link between the two.").
63. Jeff McMahan, Moral Intuition, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO ETHICAL THEORY
92, 94 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2000).
64. Id. For some elaboration, see Mark C. Modak-Truran, A Pragmatic Justification
of the Judicial Hunch, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 55, 65-66 (2001) (discussing the use of
intuitive knowledge and its effect on judicial decisionmaking).
65. McMahan, supra note 63, at 94; cf. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticism
and Justification, in MORAL KNOWLEDGE? 3, 25 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark
Timmons eds., 1996) ("Moral intuitionism is... the claim that some people are justified in
believing some moral claims in some way that does not depend on the believer inferring or
even being able to infer the claim from anything else that the person believes.").
66. McMahan, supra note 63, at 94. The possibility of unconscious cognitive
processing as somehow contributing to the arrived-at intuition is sometimes thought to be
fully compatible with the further belief that some intuitions are unprovable but self-
evident. For discussion, see, for example, Brad Hooker, Intuitions and Moral Theorizing,
in ETHICAL INTUITIONISM 161, 163 (Philip Stratton-Lake ed., 2002); Sirmott-Armstrong,
supra note 65, at 25 (discussing the possibility of a belief being justified, but not justified
by anything in particular); Mark Timmons, Book Review, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REVS., Oct.
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not imply that the judgment is arrived at "instantaneously."'
Instead, "moral reflection may take time even when it does not
involve conscious inferential reasoning."68
The plausibility of these claims is certainly subject to
contest. But some modern forms of intuitionism helpfully allow
for the possibility of mistaken or untrue intuitive beliefs,69 and
for the possibility of meaningful challenge to,7" revision of,"1
uncertainty of,72 and improvement in7" the outcomes of intuitive
process. 4 Understood in this plausible way, it seems possible that
intuition may play a significant and defensible role in judicial
decisionmaking.
B. Some Philosophical Critiques of Various Sorts of Intuitionism
The above brief sampling of some understandings of
intuitionism suggests that some forms of intuition can seem more
defensible, and closer to some forms of judicial decisionmaking,
than we might have imagined. But to assess the proper role, if
any, of intuition in judicial decisionmaking, we should take some
account of the philosophical critiques of intuition that seem most
relevant to judicial intuition. Our purpose is not to defend or
7, 2003, http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1317 (reviewing H.A. PRICHARD, MORAL
WRITINGS (Jim MacAdam ed., 2002) and W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (Philip
Stratton-Lake ed., 2002)).
67. McMahan, supra note 63, at 94.
68. Id.
69. Hooker, supra note 66, at 165. Self-evident beliefs may on some definitions
actually be false, and some true self-evident beliefs may not be seen as true or as self-
evident by some persons. See Russ SHAFER-LANDAU, MORAL REALISM: A DEFENCE 258
(2003). Some time ago, Aquinas recognized the latter possibility. See 1 ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pt. I, Q. 94, Art. 2 (Fathers of the English Dominican
Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947) (1652).
70. See Hooker, supra note 66, at 165.
71. See id.
72. See Platts, supra note 62, at 285.
73. See id.
74. Thus our brief examination of intuitionism will remain neutral on some other
occasionally claimed elements of intuitionism, such as whether intuitionist ethical
systems must have "a plurality of first principles," or whether there must then be
"priority rules, or some decision procedure," for selecting among such a plurality of first
principles in a given case. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30 (rev. ed. 1999)
(discussing intuition and the balancing of competing values); Christine Swanton, The
Rationality of Ethical Intuitionism, 65 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 172, 172 (1987) (defining
an intuitionistic system). Nor need we take sides in the historic Prichard and Ross debate
over whether our most useful moral intuitions occur in particular contexts bearing upon
particular concrete duties or instead as bearing upon more general principles of moral
duty. For the former view, see H.A. PRICHARD, What Is the Basis of Moral Obligation?, in
MORAL WRITINGS, supra note 66, at 1, 5. For the latter view, see ROSS, supra note 66, at
30. See also HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 101 (7th ed., Hackett Pub. Co.
1981) (1907) (anticipating, without endorsing, elements of a more Rossian position).
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explain intuition at every turn; some criticisms can be left for the
specialists. Instead, our purpose is to allow some of the most
relevant criticisms to affect our sense of the proper role, if any, of
intuition in judicial decisionmaking.
We might consider first the extreme case of a strongly held
intuition that seems, unlike Justice Stewart's judgment of
nonobscenity," to draw upon nothing relevant to the case beyond
the intuition itself. Consider, for example, a bare intuition that
despite all the available evidence indicating otherwise, one's
distant child is safe from harm.76 One critique of this bare and
extreme form of intuition asks whether there is any difference
between such an intuition that turns out, happily and for others
unexpectedly, to be right, and an intuition under similar
circumstances that turns out to be wrong. Are there any
systematic differences in the subjective intuitive experience, or in
any other detectable way, between such cases?
The intuitionist may respond that intuitions of the sort
discussed by Justice Stewart in Jacobellis involve specific,
substantive considerations. Justice Stewart presumably
considered, for example, whether any persons depicted were
wearing clothes, or were depicted engaged in particular activities
of one sort or another. He might well have taken any number of
considerations into account, consciously or unconsciously, in the
process of arriving at his intuitive result. And his perceptions
and judgment in any of these respects could well be supported or
criticized by means of familiar sorts of argument."
By contrast, in the case of an intuition apparently drawing
upon nothing in particular, we can easily understand that "it is
puzzling why an intuition-a normative conviction-should be
supposed to be a test of anything." 8 That sort of bare intuition
might well be thought to be "fundamentally non-explanatory. 7 9
75. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
76. This scenario is suggested by W.D. HUDSON, MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 101-
04(1970).
77. The philosopher G.E. Moore argued that reasons can be given for or against
even immediate moral intuitions, but his argument seems to assume that our moral
intuitions will be about how to maximize the good, about which reasons for choosing one
course rather than another can be given. This assumption is itself subject to intuition-
conflicting intuitions, in fact. It is unclear how to resolve such conflicting intuitions on
Moore's theory. For Moore's specific discussion, see G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 198
(Thomas Baldwin ed., rev. ed. 1993).
78. RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 21 (1979).
79. David McNaughton, Intuitionism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO ETHICAL
THEORY, supra note 63, at 268, 270. See also, for this and a series of other critiques of
intuitionism, the work of the nonetheless intuitionist ROBERT AUDI, THE GOOD IN THE
RIGHT: A THEORY OF INTUITION AND INTRINSIC VALUE (2004). For commentary on
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Both its genesis, and its justification, may be mysteries. But
whether or not these criticisms are valid of an intuition
apparently drawing upon nothing in particular, there seems less
reason to be sure that a Justice Stewart-type intuition must be
defective on such a basis. Justice Stewart's intuition may, as
depicted above, have somehow "tested" for something like the
admittedly complex idea of obscenity. Justice Stewart could have"explained" his judicial result to at least some degree, without
going much beyond a doubtless imperfect reconstruction of what
his intuitive processes involved."0  Again, Justice Stewart's
intuition could have resulted from considering, say, clothing (if
any) and visibility and particular activities depicted, along with
any message and context, among other factors. Discussing these
considerations could assist in unpacking his intuition and the
legal result Justice Stewart reached in the case.
An intuition in this partially-articulable sense can offer some
degree of explanatory power. But if we think of the intuition as
just the conclusion to a preceding mysterious and impenetrable
intuitive process, then the intuition itself will not explain very
much. A useful explanation in the legal context will usually
consist of the entire written legal opinion, including findings of
fact deemed relevant. Some portion of the opinion may amount to
an attempt to reconstruct, and to articulate or report, the
intuitive process.
A further criticism of some forms of intuitionism builds on
our assumption that intuitions, even if fervently experienced,
may be mistaken."' What seems intuitively right or wrong to any
of us seems to depend upon our culture and upbringing. 2 Unless
we adopt an unambitious moral relativism,8 intuitionism may
leave society with an unsatisfactory stalemate in which one
group's intuitions are unproductively matched against another
group's partly conflicting intuitions. Each group may test its own
intuitions by other of its own intuitions. 4 But ultimately, on a
pure intuitionist theory, there may be no shared appeal beyond
intuitionist views of self-evidence and on the views of Robert Audi in particular, see MARK
TIMMONS, MORALITY WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: A DEFENSE OF ETHICAL CONTEXTUALISM
232-34 (1999).
80. Of course, to the degree that Justice Stewart's intuitive process operated
subconsciously, the task of reconstructing and articulating that process becomes far more
difficult.
81. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
82. See BRANDT, supra note 78, at 21-22, 236.
83. For background, see, for example, RELATIvISM: INTERPRETATION AND
CONFRONTATION (Michael Krausz ed., 1989).
84. See BRANDT, supra note 78, at 21-22. See also the extended footnote discussion
in LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 72 n. 108 (2002).
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each group's own intuitions, including intuitions about
intergroup conflict and tolerance.
If all we can draw upon is our own intuitions as revised in
light of our other intuitions, then there does seem to be no
neutral ground upon which to rationally choose between our own
intuitions and those of another culture. But this problem, or
some parallel problem, would also seem to confront those who
would limit or eliminate intuition in broadly moral judgments as
well. 5 We could check our intuitions by comparison with
whatever else we also believe that is not an intuition. That
process of evaluating our intuitions in light of our own
nonintuitive beliefs might bring us into agreement with some
other culture. But it is still difficult (if not impossible) to step
outside all of our relevant beliefs, intuitive or not, to reach some
neutral ground on which our beliefs can be rationally and fairly"6
compared with other systems of beliefs that we only partially
share.
Whether we are intuitionists or not, we can still undertake
the admittedly difficult task of sincerely critiquing and
reassessing our culture's most cherished beliefs. And whether we
are intuitionists or not, we obviously face great difficulties in
gaining enough perspective to see how even our own posterity
will judge us. It certainly seems "there are limits to what
intuitionistic methods can show and to the kinds of disputes
intuitions can resolve."8 7
Yet if intuitionism-along with other forms of
decisionmaking-has its limits in reaching and accounting for its
results, intuitionism is also sometimes thought to be, in its
proper role, indispensable and inevitable. As one contemporary
philosopher has observed, "It is hard to see how to justify any
substantive moral view without appealing to some moral
intuition at some point."" Even those who reject moral intuitions
seem to unavoidably wind up criticizing one sort of theory or
85. See BRAD HOOKER, IDEAL CODE, REAL WORLD: A RULE-CONSEQUENTIALIST
THEORY OF MORALITY 11-13 (2000) ("[W]e cannot evaluate our evaluative beliefs, or
anything else, from a completely non-evaluative point of view. If we take up a point of
view stripped of all evaluative conviction, we have no basis for evaluation." (emphasis
omitted)).
86. Precisely what constitutes a "neutral" ground, or a broadly rational basis for
preferring one system's belief over another system's conflicting belief, could also be
subject to dispute between cultures.
87. Sanford S. Levy, A Limit on Intuitionistic Methods of Moral Reasoning, 37 J.
VALUE INQUIRY 463, 463 (2003).
88. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Relativity and Intuitionism, 12 PHIL. ISSUES
305. 306 (2002).
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another "for implying counter-intuitive moral conclusions."89 In a
practical sense, intuitionism may thus be simply inescapable.
The well-known moral theory of John Rawls, for example,
has been criticized by the philosopher Richard Hare for
disclaiming, but then also utilizing, "appeals to intuition at all
the crucial points in his arguments."9" Rawls in fact forthrightly
admits that "any ethical view is bound to rely on intuition to
some degree at many points."9' Rawls seeks, however, to reduce
the need to appeal to intuition in moral argument.9' At least in
part, this desire reflects the fear that the crucial balancing in
morals, and in so much of the law and adjudication, will be
conducted differently by persons who rank or weigh principles or
other considerations differently. 93 With the crucial balances being
struck in different ways, we will inevitably differ on what justice,
or a legally just judicial outcome, would require.94
Rawls seeks to reduce the need to appeal to balancing, or to
intuition more broadly, most famously through what he calls
lexical or strictly ranked principles of justice,9 in which lower
ordered principles are not accommodated at any cost in higher
ordered principles until the requirements of the higher ordered
89. Id.; see also Nelson, supra note 61, at 59 (asserting, but not arguing, that
"appeal to moral intuitions [is] unavoidable").
90. R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING 75 (1981). Hare himself argues that because our
intuitions, based on our peculiar upbringings, can conflict, we will need some distinctive,
nonintuitive kind of moral thinking to resolve the conflict. See id. at 40. Actually, this
does not follow, as we might have successively higher order intuitions as to how conflicts
between lower order intuitions should be resolved. And no one's moral thinking, of
whatever sort, can be further rationally justified beyond some point. In any event, Hare
famously refers to the necessary nonintuitive thinking as "critical thinking." Id. Critical
thinking adjudicates among intuitions by recourse to logic and nonmoral facts. See id.
It is, however, entirely unclear how we are to decide on the relevance, weight, and
meaning of the nonmoral facts on any conflict between intuitions without some further
appeal to moral intuition at just this point. For example, suppose we have conflicting
intuitions about some level of unintended deaths of noncombatants. It is difficult to
believe that the bare logic of morals, along with all the nonmoral facts available, will be
able to tell us the acceptable number of civilian deaths without some further moral
intuition as to how to best respond to and accommodate conflicting nonmoral facts. Moral
intuition would be necessary to tell which nonmoral facts were relevant, and even to tell
us that all the nonmoral facts pointed toward the same moral choice.
Whether all the intuitions brought to bear at the higher, critical level will by
themselves be entirely adequate is another question. In any event, Professor Hare's hope
to avoid any need for substantive moral intuition at the critical moral level seems unlikely
to be satisfied.
91. RAWLS, supra note 74, at 35.
92. See id. at 36 ("[W]e should do what we can to reduce the direct appeal to our
considered judgments.").
93. Id. at 36-37.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 37-38.
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principles are fully met. 6 Higher ordered principles are thus
given absolute priority in any conflict with lower ordered
principles. No balancing, and no intuition, is in this sense
required.
Of course, Rawls's theory is subject to almost endless
elaboration, critique, and defense. But just as Professor Hare
himself cannot avoid recourse to intuition by appealing to a"critical" level of morality,97 so Rawls in turn cannot avoid a
similar reliance on intuition by constructing a ranked or a
lexically ordered set of principles of justice.
Suppose, to oversimplify, Rawls wants a liberty principle
always to outrank a fair equality of opportunity principle, or vice
versa for that matter. Whether we should accept this ordering, in
all circumstances, or perhaps in some circumstances only, and
more crucially how it should be interpreted and applied in
practice, will inevitably require recourse to moral intuitions. Can
we in some or all circumstances reasonably prefer fulfilling even
the very last and least valuable increment of our higher ranked
principle at the expense of whatever amount of fulfillment of the
next highest principle we could otherwise have? Is that how we
normally treat hierarchies of values in our own lives? If we rank
education above entertainment, do we typically conclude that no
degree of entertainment can be worth the smallest sacrifice of
education? If not, where is the proper line to be drawn, and how,
in the absence of any intuition, do we know?
Can we be sure that a significant increase in fair equality of
opportunity is never worth any sacrifice of any basic liberty? Can
we responsibly assume that such trade-offs do not arise in
practice? Don't we want to consider making such an exchange, in
intuitively appropriate cases, partly through intuitive value
assessments? And doesn't intuition have a role in confirming or
denying the possibility that increasing equality of opportunity
could actually also increase basic liberty overall? Of course, more
than one sense of the idea of basic liberty could come into play.
But don't we then need intuition to help us choose which sense of
liberty is most worth protecting?98
96. Id. at 38.
97. See supra note 90.
98. For helpful background on whether there is actually any genuine conflict
between the most valuable forms of liberty and equality, see the conflicting views of Sir
Isaiah Berlin and Professor Ronald Dworkin in, respectively, ISAIAH BERLIN, The Pursuit
of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HuMANITY 1, 12-13 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991)
(arguing that liberty and equality inevitably conflict) and Ronald Dworkin, Do Liberal
Values Conflict?, in THE LEGACY OF ISAIAH BERLIN 73 (Mark Lilla et al. eds., 2001)
(responding to Berlin and arguing that liberty, in certain forms, and equality may not
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Thus, just as Professor Hare cannot adjudicate among
conflicting intuitions without some role for a further or higher
ordered intuition, so also Professor Rawls cannot avoid balancing
and intuition, even in the choice of interpretation and application
of lexical principles intended to avoid balancing.99 This is not to
suggest that intuition will guide us to a unanimous choice, or
that intuition is all that should be called upon in such cases. We
will certainly also need the capacity to draw careful inferences,
and we will need as much proper motivation and relevant
knowledge of fact as we can get.'00 But intuition will also be
indispensable.
IV. INTUITION, BALANCING TESTS, AND ABSOLUTISM IN THE LAw
By this point in the analysis, we may rightly begin to suspect
that the actual and legitimate role of intuition in the law may be
much greater than is often supposed. The discussion above
suggests that intuition may play a surprisingly large and
pervasive role not only in weighing and balancing, but in the
design, interpretation, and operation of decisionmaking
procedures that might claim to be independent of weighing and
balancing as well. Eventually, we will more fully confirm that
intuition plays a pervasive role in all standard forms of judicial
reasoning. Again, this is not to suggest that intuition by itself
suffices to link a collection of facts to a unique legal conclusion.
The main point is instead to continue building our appreciation
of the universal dependence of adjudication on intuition. This
Part illustrates in particular the role of intuition in a variety of
judicial balancing tests, and in the purportedly absolutist,
nonbalancing free speech jurisprudence of Justice Hugo Black.
That intuition plays an important role in judicial balancing
tests should hardly be a surprise. Justice Cardozo vaguely hints
at this possibility in his classic text, The Nature of the Judicial
Process.'' Cardozo writes, "If you ask how [the judge] is to know
when one interest outweighs another, I can only answer that he
must get his knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from
necessarily conflict).
99. As a final complication, unless Rawls merely assumes the possibility away,
there may be cases in which sacrificing a small amount of the liberty principle would
involve costs borne mainly by the very best off, or by the already freest, and with
resulting gains in fair equality of opportunity. How could we fully reasonably decide for or
against this course without the exercise of intuition?
100. See HARE, supra note 90, at 40 (relying on nonmoral facts as one of the two
bases for critical thinking).
101. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (William S.
Hein & Co. 1997) (1921).
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experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life itself."10 2
Cardozo's refusal at this point to even gesture in the direction of
any recognizable method perhaps suggests the role of intuition in
interest balancing. But the reference to "reflection" may suggest
not only an intuitional process, but some more formal,
structured, systematic thinking as well-which in turn may itself
rely on intuition at crucial points.
There is a substantial amount of literature discussing
various types of weighing and balancing in adjudication.
Professor Alexander Aleinikoff, for example, distinguishes
"definitional" balancing tests10 3 that are not supposed to require
further balancing in their application from "ad hoc" balancing
tests'0 4 that plainly invite further explicit balancing in their
application. Professor Aleinikoff then further distinguishes
balancing in general from "conceptualism and formalism."' We
should, however, be skeptical that any judicial balancing test or
any test that strives for nonbalancing formalism can avoid
relying on intuition in its very construction, interpretation, or
concrete application.
Consider, for example, the definitional balancing or the
nonbalancing formalism that seems to pervade the classic
separation of powers case Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.16 The various opinions, including Justice Black's opinion
for the Court denying to the President the power to seize the
steel mills to prevent a threatened strike during the Korean
War,0 7 seek to apply separation of powers principles in a rigorous
fashion.
102. Id. at 113; see also Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895-96 (7th Cir.
2001) (stating that the sliding scale balancing test for the availability of a preliminary
injunction is "'subjective and intuitive'" in character (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Mead
Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 12 (7th Cir. 1992))).
103. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 948 (1987) (referring to "definitional" balancing as "balancing that
establishes a substantive constitutional principle of general application").
104. Id. (explaining that "ad hoc" balancing is "balancing that itself is the
constitutional principle" and is used in procedural due process cases). Aleinikoff cites
Matthews, in which the Court determined how much process was due by weighing the
various private and public interests at stake, along with any difference in error rates
between offered and proposed procedures. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-48
(1976). Of course, explicit balancing tests pervade civil and criminal law, constitutional
and otherwise. To cite merely one distinctive example, consider Judge Learned Hand's
classic negligence balancing formula in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,
173 (2d Cir. 1947), transplanted to free speech in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,
212 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), and then to possible free press versus fair
trial conflicts in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
105. Aleinikoff, supra note 103, at 949.
106. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
107. See id. at 585-89 (emphasizing that the Constitution grants Congress alone
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This process reaches its height in Justice Jackson's
concurring opinion.' 8 The heart of Jackson's opinion is an almost
algebraic account of three possible relationships between the
exercise and withholding of congressional power and the scope of
the various presidential powers. The three possible general
relationships, focusing on congressional support of, indifference
toward, or hostility toward the particular presidential venture in
question, form a three-part classificatory system. 0  The
classificatory system is intended to provide some structuring
perspective for the ultimate decision of the separation of powers
case. But can we really crank the handle of Justice Jackson's
classificatory mechanism in Youngstown and expect an answer
with no additional balancing, let alone with no additional
application of any sort of judicial intuition? This seems unlikely.
The Court in Youngstown held, in particular, and on the
basis of numerous considerations, that the President could not
under the circumstances seize and operate private steel mills
pursuant to the President's powers and responsibilities as
Commander in Chief.'1' Now, this was doubtless a sensible
judicial conclusion. But the conclusion was arrived at not merely
by applying algebraically or otherwise the logically relevant legal
rules, but through the application of intuition as well.
Presumably, a Commander in Chief could order the temporary
civilian evacuation of the site of an imminent invasion. But
intuition must be called into play to determine the scope of such
a power. Could a Commander in Chief also order the digging of
defensive trenches in private lawns? Could a Commander in
Chief order all adults and school children to learn basic
vocabulary of the invading force's language, the better to foil
their plans? Could a Commander in Chief prohibit the public
discussion of military ship sailing times or military train
departure times and routes, quite aside from any free speech
issues? All with no greater external legal authority than was
available to President Truman in Youngstown?
Realistically, even if knowledgeable persons came to the
same conclusions with regard to all these hypothetical cases, they
would be doing so partly through the application of professionally
trained intuition in a given legal context. Graphing the
lawmaking authority).
108. See id. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 587-89 (majority opinion) (holding the President lacked the authority
to issue the seizure order).
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boundaries among presidential, congressional, and state
authority, or deploying the vague-and perhaps decreasingly
meaningful-concept of the "theater of war" can carry us only so
far. Even if balancing as narrowly defined is not involved in such
determinations, some form of intuition clearly is.
More generally, we should not be surprised that apparent
alternatives to balancing, such as recourse to "precedent, original
intent of the framers, history, and constitutional purpose
"' 12
actually involve balancing in themselves or in their application,1
3
or at least some crucial form of intuition. Ascertaining the intent,
at whatever level of generality, of the constitutional framers, for
example, must depend crucially upon our own intuition.14 This
does not mean that our use of logical inference is irrelevant or
inessential in such cases. But logical inference and other
nonintuitive operations must be supplemented by intuitive
assessments of possible conflicting evidence or conflicting
theories of intent. Even if all the relevant evidence of framer
intent can be identified without recourse to intuition, and even if
all the evidence is easily commensurable, ' the weight to be
assigned to each item of evidence of intent simply cannot be
determined without intuitive judgment."6
112. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation: Illusion and Reality, 41
WAYNE L. REV. 135, 164-65 (1994).
113. See id. at 163-71 (asserting that the alternatives to balancing merely shift the
balancing).
114. See supra text accompanying note 7.
115. For a discussion of commensurability, see Frederick Schauer, Commensurability
and Its Constitutional Consequences, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 785, 787 (1994) (stating that "[t]he
argument for commensurability, if successful, thus concludes that all decisional options
can, in theory, be reduced to a single value"). See also Cass R. Sunstein,
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 780-81 (1994) (arguing
that while Plato and Bentham believe "human goods should be seen as commensurable,"
this kind of valuation, "designed to aid in human reasoning, actually make[s] such
reasoning inferior to what it is when it is working well"); Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-
Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502, 1513-14 (1985)
(discussing the problems courts have with "balancing interests that even if ultimately
commensurable, are defined on different levels of generality"). But cf Richard Warner,
Does Incommensurability Matter? Incommensurability and Public Policy, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1287, 1289 (1998) ("[TIhe existence of incommensurability is inconsistent with the
claims of rational choice theory, and reflection on incommensurability reveals the serious
limitations of rational choice theory as a perspective from which to frame public policy.").
Commensurability for our purposes may be taken to mean comparability on some common
scale or framework. We shall generously assume that if things like reasons, interests, or
rights can be commensurated in adjudicative contexts, they may be commensurated on
nonintuitional as well as at least partly intuitional grounds. For further complications,
see Tushnet, supra, at 1512 ("We define the boundaries between balancing and side
constraints by balancing on a higher level.").
116. See Tushnet, supra note 115, at 1514 (noting that proper balancing requires
intuition because "the interest and facts balanced have to be described on the same level
of generality, and on the right level of generality").
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More complex models of balancing may require more
inferences, and more nonintuitive reasoning, but also more
intuition as well. Consider for example the "Madisonian"
balancing described by Professor David Faigman." ' Madisonian
balancing focuses on particular transactions,1 ' but seeks to avoid
piecemeal analysis"' by considering all the implicated
constitutional-rights and government-interest claims in the
adjudication.120 This ambitious balancing "thus aggregates rights
and then balances them against the government's interests,
which have always been aggregated for balancing purposes."''
Now, we may not be surprised if a judge who admits to
intuitionism cannot articulate his or her decisionmaking process
in a given case.'22 But we should be surprised if a judge who
claims not to have relied on intuition can be no more articulate in
reconstructing a judicial determination.'23  A Madisonian-
balancing judge might claim to merely be following logically
mandated rules in reaching his or her decision.2 4 In a simple
case, intentional or explicit gender discrimination, for example,
might evoke mid-level constitutional scrutiny, thus requiring an
important government interest and a substantial relationship
between the gender classification and the government interest.'
117. See David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 643-44 (1994) (noting "Madisonian Balancing"
assesses the constitutional costs of an action from a "Constitution-wide perspective,
rather than from a right-specific or amendment-specific viewpoint").
118. See id. at 644 ("The balance is struck at a transactional level, by comparing the
depth of the full constitutional infringement with the government's justification for its
action.").
119. See id. at 643 (stating "constitutional injury caused by some government action
cannot be described in a piecemeal fashion").
120. See id. at 643-44 ("A court's evaluation of the constitutionality of a challenged
government action must entail a full assessment of the constitutional costs of that
action.").
121. Id. at 644.
122. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall
not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing
so. But I know it when I see it."); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
123. See Shaman, supra note 112, at 168 (arguing that the original intent approach
as attempted by the Supreme Court has failed because "[wihen judges claim or even
believe that they are engaged in an objective, impersonal search for the framers' intent,
what they really end up unearthing are their own values").
124. See Faigman, supra note 117, at 654 (describing scenarios where a Madisonian-
balancing judge uncritically defers to the legislature's reasons for passing the law, "the
balancing court merely peers over the shoulder of the balancing legislature to ensure that
the scales are not defective").
125. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that classifications
based on gender must satisfy intermediate level scrutiny). Of course, "[tihe abstract
concept of balancing ... tells us nothing about which interests, rights, or principles get
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But how is the Madisonian-balancing judge to determine, for
example, that the several government interests cited in support
of the classification, each promoted to one degree or another,
either do or do not add up to one overall interest that can be
ranked under the circumstances of the case as important?126 Even
judgments as to the degree that interests overlap may well
require intuition. Reference to some particular prior case rather
than another for guidance may itself require intuition. 127 And the
relevant circumstances of the selected prior case, as well as the
degree to which the same government interests were threatened
or promoted, will be determined to be similar or differ at least
partly by intuition.121
weighed or how weights are assigned." Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the
Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1987).
126. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 217, 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Whether the
relationship between the classification and the various interests promoted to one degree
or another counts as "substantial" will also require intuition at some point.
127. See Shaman, supra note 112, at 165 ("Following precedent is not an alternative
to balancing, but rather merely shifts the occurrence of balancing to an earlier case."); see
also supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
128. Professor Stephen Gottlieb very usefully points out that "rules are based on and
incorporate intuitive judgments, often the very balancing they were meant to replace.
Thus, both balancing and rules depend on intuitive judgments we do not know how to
explain." Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Significant Interests, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 825, 850 (1994) (footnotes omitted). Our focus, unlike Professor Gottlieb's,
is on intuition rather than on balancing. This is for several reasons. First, academic
lawyers are generally more familiar with the literature on the various forms of balancing
than on the technical philosophical literature of intuitionism. And more importantly,
many classic intuitive judgments do not seem to involve any conscious balancing of
interests. See supra notes 1-3, 7, 24-29 and accompanying text. We may, for example,
intuit that it would be wrong to try to placate a destructive mob by scapegoating and
sacrificing an innocent party, even without doing, either consciously or unconsciously, the
complex interest balancing process that might otherwise be involved. See Sunstein, supra
note 115, at 799 (describing the complex balancing process when goods are
incommensurable, such as a mother asked to hand one of her two children to a Nazi
officer).
But this does not mean, especially for judicial opinion writers, that even such
intuitions cannot in any meaningful sense be publicly explained, justified, and reasonably
defended by the opinion-writing judge. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
269 (1964) ("[L]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It
must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.... The constitutional
safeguard [of First Amendment protection] ... 'was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.'" (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))). A Justice Stewart-like
intuition of obscenity or nonobscenity, see supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text, could
in an important legitimizing sense be defended by passing in review some of the specific
features of the material examined by Justice Stewart, perhaps with descriptive
comparison with other material elsewhere found either obscene or not obscene under the
proper legal standards. See A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Att'y Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (articulating a three-element test for
obscene material which involves comparing "contemporary community standards" and
ascertaining whether the work is "utterly without redeeming social value"). The relevance
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What, though, of claims that rely on a rule-based absolutism
in law and legal opinion writing, exemplified perhaps most
famously in Justice Hugo Black's free speech absolutism?
129
Justice Black did not deny that balancing was somehow involved
in free speech law, but he generally believed that the balancing
was properly confined to the historical stage of drafting and
ratifying the Free Speech Clause itself.3' Is this attempt to
confine balancing, and intuition more generally, to such an early
historical stage of the process, long before the case adjudication
itself is undertaken, at all likely to succeed?
For several reasons, this seems doubtful in the extreme.
Bypassing crucial reliance on intuition at the adjudicative stage
of typical free speech cases is grossly unrealistic. To begin with, a
court must occasionally-as in the case of the symbolic burning of
an object,' the display of brief verbal messages on a jacket,3 2 or
commercial barroom nude dancing"'3 -decide whether "speech" in
the constitutional sense is present at all. We may make even
these initial categorical determinations largely by reference to
whatever we take to be the purposes of the Free Speech Clause.'
But it is difficult to believe that judges in such cases can escape
the need to apply intuition if they are given merely some list of
aims sought through freedom of speech. Not all of the purposes of
protecting speech need point to some single classification as
and persuasive power of any such written opinion could, in turn, be largely a matter of
further intuition, nonintuitive reasoning and inference, or a combination of both. See
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973) (rejecting the Memoirs three-element test
and delineating a new three-element test for obscene material).
129. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., concurring) ("Unlike the
Court,... I vote to reverse exclusively on the ground that the Times and the individual
defendants had an absolute, unconditional constitutional right to publish in the Times
advertisement their criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials.").
130. For general discussion, see Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV.
865, 876-79 (1960). For commentary, see Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr. Justice
Black on the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. REV. 428, 441 (1967) (discussing Justice
Black's antipathy towards balancing First Amendment protections).
131. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("We cannot accept
the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever
the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.").
132. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("Cohen's absurd and immature antic, in my view, was mainly conduct and little
speech.").
133. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (finding nude
dancing in the commercial context as expressive conduct within the scope of
constitutionally defined speech).
134. See Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 127-
30 (1989) (delineating the consequentialist and nonconsequentialist justifications for free
speech); see also Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593
(1982) (arguing that the "constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only
one true value... 'individual self-realization").
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speech or as nonspeech.'35 The exercise of judicial intuition seems
inescapable.
Or suppose it is asked whether an absolute right of free
speech contains an implied exception for extreme emergency. It is
sometimes colorfully said that the Constitution "is not a suicide
pact."'36 Determining whether the Free Speech Clause should be
read to contain an extreme emergency exception' 7 may well
require historical judgment and intuition. Determining whether
any such exception should be thought of as itself emphasizing
balancing may require further intuition. And determining finally
whether the exception properly applies in a given case may, of
course, also require intuition.
Of course, extreme cases are also likely to be rare. A more
common circumstance in which even a presumed free speech
absolutist must confront the need for adjudicative intuition
involves the determination of whether some government action
really rises to the level of a legally actionable restriction of
someone's freedom of speech.3 s Much of what governments do,
including tax collection, imposition of traffic rules, enforcement of
property rights, and such, can sometimes be upheld not as a
justified burdening of speech,'39 but as simply not sufficient, in
135. See Greenawalt, supra note 134, at 127 ("There is no single correct way of
presenting the justifications that matter for a principle of freedom of speech.... [Tihe
reasons for free speech are based on complex and somewhat overlapping elements, no
basic division or multiple categorization can be wholly satisfactory.").
136. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309-10 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963)).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 991 (W.D. Wis.
1979) (discussing an injunction against publishing details of hydrogen bomb construction,
even in the context of a broader public policy discussion). For crucial discussion of the
possibility of violating otherwise absolute rules in extreme emergency circumstances, see
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 259 (1977) (defining the Walzer dilemma:
"should I wager this determinate crime (the killing of innocent people) against that
immeasurable evil (a Nazi triumph)"); Michael Walzer, World War II." Why Was This War
Different?, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 19-21 (1971) (arguing that the deliberate killing of
noncombatants may by justified in certain situations). For one response, see R. George
Wright, Combating Civilian Casualties: Rules and Balancing in the Developing Law of
War, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 129, 158-72 (2003) (contemplating a plethora of minor
variations to the Walzer dilemma and discussing how to balance these conflicting moral
dilemmas).
138. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976) (upholding
a government zoning ordinance as not violating the First Amendment, even though it
singled out theaters that exhibit sexually explicit adult movies).
139. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 79, 89 (1949) (upholding an ordinance
prohibiting "loud and raucous" sound trucks on public streets). Contra id. at 102 (Black,
J., dissenting) ("The basic premise of the First Amendment is that all present instruments
of communication, as well as others that inventive genius may bring into being, shall be
free from governmental censorship or prohibition.").
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magnitude or directness and intention, to count as a burden on
speech in the first place. 140
Even more disturbing for a free speech absolutist, though,
would be the extremely common instances in which there are free
speech values, if not explicit free speech claims, on both sides of
the case to be adjudicated.14 ' Free speech absolutism alone cannot
resolve such cases. At a minimum, some complex set of priority
rules will also be needed. And it seems inescapable that in
deciding on such rules, their priorities, limits, and application
must at various points depend upon judicial intuition.
There are also cases in which free speech rights come into
inescapable conflict with other specific individual constitutional
rights. In this respect, free speech or free press rights with
various fair trial or due process rights, for example, may clash.4 2
It is implausible to imagine that all such cases can be properly
resolved without any substantial sacrifice of free speech values.'
Nor is it plausible that any increase in the freedom of speech
always trumps, without recourse to intuition, any sacrifice
whatsoever of equal protection or any other individual
constitutional rights.' In general, there is no plausible form of
adjudicative absolutism that can consistently escape the need for
intuitionism at some crucial point.
V. SOME OTHER POSSIBLE FORMS OF JUDICIAL REASONING AND
THEIR INESCAPABLE DEPENDENCE ON INTUITION
A. Inferentialism
What realistic alternatives are there to judicial intuitionism?
As we have seen in connection with both judicial'4' and more
140. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47, 53-55 (1986)
(finding that a zoning statute was aimed at the secondary effects of adult theaters and
permissibly restricted adult theaters to certain areas); Young, 427 U.S. at 71-73 (holding
that the local government's interest in zoning did not violate the constitutional rights of
adult theater owner).
141. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (upholding "campaign-free
zone" restrictions although it "presents ... a particularly difficult reconciliation: the
accommodation of the right to engage in political discourse with the right to vote").
142. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568-70 (1976) (discussing
how an absolute right to speech would hinder the constitutional requirement of a fair
trial).
143. See id. at 561 (discussing the history and dangers of suspending categorical
guarantees).
144. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 206 (finding the right to vote without potential
intimidation outweighed free speech protection).
145. See supra Part II.
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technical philosophical'46 discussions, different approaches to
intuitionism are certainly possible. For the sake of clarity, let us
continue to think of an intuition as a judgment that does not
directly 147 involve conscious 48 inferential reasoning from one's
other beliefs. 4 ' If we think of judicial intuition in these terms,
what can we say about judicial intuition and other possible forms
of judicial reasoning?
Not all commonly recognized forms of judicial reasoning
operate at the same level as judicial intuitionism or as a rival to
judicial intuitionism."' But an alternative approach we may call
"judicial inferentialism" might operate in some such fashion. A
case for both moral and judicial inferentialism can be built from
the fact of pervasive disagreements among both moral and
judicial intuitionists themselves on important substantive
principles."' One contemporary philosopher writes along these
lines that
[tihe range of disagreements among strongly-held non-
inferable moral beliefs.., shows that many moral believers
are unreliable. It doesn't matter that we do not know how
many are unreliable or whether any particular one is
unreliable. The fact that moral disagreements are
widespread still reveals enough unreliability to create a
need for inferential justification of moral beliefs, contrary to
moral intuitionism. 
2
Or, more concisely, "[t]he only way to check the accuracy of moral
beliefs is by inference.' 53
On such an approach, moral and judicial outcomes should
depend crucially on chains of rational inference of one sort or
another. Some sort of "explicit method" of reaching results,
146. See supra Part III.
147. It seems possible that an intuitive judgment might not be directly dependent
upon any conscious inferential reasoning, but somehow depend on inferential reasoning in
some more indirect fashion.
148. While an intuition might not depend on conscious inferential reasoning, it might
nonetheless depend, indirectly or otherwise, on an inferential reasoning process not
reaching the level of conscious awareness.
149. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text, as well as Part III more broadly.
150. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Reliance on Public Policy: An
Empirical Analysis of Products Liability Decisions, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1570, 1585-90
(1991) (explaining how judges consider fairness, efficiency, process, and policy when
making their decisions).
151. See Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 88, at 317-18 (explaining that irresolvable
moral disagreements occur, that many moral beliefs are unreliable, and that there is a
need for inferential justification of moral disagreements).




perhaps through "priority rules," may be utilized.' In some way,
the moral or judicial outcome depends on inferring or being able
to infer the outcome from one or more of the decisionmaker's
other beliefs."'
Intuitionists, in contrast, can and do recognize some
unavoidable if limited role in decisionmaking for inference and
deduction.' But the intuitionist generally must claim something
like the following:
It is no less logically respectable to base a judgement that
some deed of murder or mutilation is wrong on an
immediate and compelling perception that this is so, than
to approach the issue from a more complex ethical
perspective in which the particular judgement has to be
derived from a more general, or indeed universal,
judgement."7
The most ambitious claims of both the intuitionist and the
inferentialist, however, cannot be entirely sustained. One
problem, for example, with trying to directly and immediately
perceive that a murder, or murder in general, is wrong lies in the
complexity of murder."8 Perhaps some "mere" killings are
conceptually simple enough in context to be nearly perceived as
murder. Perhaps some nearly "perceived" murders are
sufficiently self-contained to be nearly perceived as wrong. But
murders cannot generally be perceived or perceived as wrong
without the crucial support of a number of sustaining inferences
and assumptions, because a murder is ordinarily a morally,
legally, socially, and psychologically complex act."' Perhaps, by
154. But see J.O. Urmson, A Defence of Intuitionism, 75 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y
111, 111 (1975) (stating that one of the features of intuition theories is "'they include no
explicit method, no priority rules, for weighing"' (quoting RAWLS, supra note 74, at 30)).
155. Contra Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 65, at 25 (defining intuitionism in
opposing terms). In a much more elaborately developed context, the philosopher Robert
Brandom argues that "what distinguishes specifically discursive (or conceptual] practices
from the doings of non-concept-using creatures is their inferential articulation. To talk
about concepts is to talk about roles in reasoning." ROBERT B. BRANDOM, ARTICULATING
REASONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INFERENTIALISM 10-11 (2000); see also id. at 11 ("Saying
or thinking that things are thus-and-so is undertaking a distinctive kind of inferentially
articulated commitment ... ").
156. See, e.g., JONATHAN DANCY, MORAL REASONS 95 (1993) (discussing intuitionist
W.D. Ross: "Ross goes on to admit that there are occasional exceptional circumstances
where we do 'apprehend individual facts by deduction', both in ethics and elsewhere.").
157. BRENDA ALMOND, EXPLORING ETHICS 105 (1998).
158. See Richard L. Wiener, Death Penalty Research in Nebraska: How Do Judges
and Juries Reach Penalty Decisions?, 81 NEB. L. REV. 757, 768-69 (2002) (explaining that
judges and juries make decisions about the death penalty based on the presence of various
aggravating and mitigating factors).
159. See, for example, the issues raised by Guyora Binder, The Origins of American
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way of analogy, "rage" can be perceived, but even if so, "righteous
indignation" plainly cannot.
When we pronounce an act, under complex circumstances, to
be not only (an intentional) killing, but "murder," or "righteous
indignation," however, we are on the other hand not merely
logically deriving a particular judgment from a more general
judgment.6 ° At the very least, the general judgments on which
we might rely are themselves inevitably built up of various
unproven intuitions not reducible to a series of rigorous,
connecting inferences.' In general, before we could conclude that
killing under the circumstances is wrong, we would need to know
much, both through unproven intuition and by inference, about
pain and suffering, loss and intention, and motivation and
excuse, among other matters.
B. Reliabilism
Sometimes, though, appeal is made against pure intuition
not so much to inferentialism 6' as to the reliability of the process
through which a moral or judicial judgment was arrived at.
Hearing more than one side of an argument may contribute more
to a reliable adjudicative process than would a purely ex parte
adjudication. 63 By analogy, some methods of judging whether
there will be an eclipse of the moon tonight may be more reliable
than others. Consulting a group of university astronomers or a
recognized almanac may be more reliable than merely tossing a
Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59 (2004) (analyzing the sources and the evolution
of American felony murder laws); Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J.
375, 379-87 (1994) (examining the law of murder and its changes over the years); and
Alan C. Michaels, Note, Defining Unintended Murder, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 786 (1985)
(discussing previous attempts to define unintended murder).
160. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Givelber, supra note 159, at 378 (asserting that a degree of
"arbitrariness" is used in capital punishment decisions).
162. See BRANDOM, supra note 155, at 38-39 (distinguishing inferentialist and
reliabilist approaches to observation); SHAFER-LANDAU, supra note 69, at 273 ('The basic
idea behind any form of reliabilism is that the epistemic status of a belief depends
crucially on the way it came about."); Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 65, at 3, 28
(discussing moral epistemology and reliabilism); see also SIDGWICK, supra note 74, at 213
("It may ... be possible to prove that some ethical beliefs have been caused in such a way
as to make it probable that they are wholly or partially erroneous. . ."). For a recent
brief critique of moral reliabilism, see David Merli, Book Review, 113 MIND 778, 780
(2004) (reviewing SHAFER-LANDAU, supra note 69, and asserting that many apparently
false, even abhorrent moral beliefs were formed carefully and are thus thought to be
justified even though the belief-formation process may not count as reliable).
163. See John R. Allison, Combinations of Decision-making Functions, Ex Parte
Communications, and Related Biasing Influences: A Process-Value Analysis, 1993 UTAH L.




coin, even if both methods are imperfect. Perhaps, then, some
methods of arriving at a resolution to moral questions, or to legal
disputes, are more similarly reliable than others. Consulting only
currently popular opinion,1 64 or only one's own damaged belief-
forming mechanisms,"' can in this sense sacrifice reliability.
One of the best known defenses of a form of reliabilism in
the judicial context is that of Chief Judge David Bazelon in Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA. 6' Ethyl Corp. addressed the problem of responsible
judicial review of an agency's complex, technical determination of
the health risk posed by lead additives in gasoline. Judge
Bazelon emphasized, at least in this context, rigorous judicial
review of the agency's compliance with the mandated steps in the
agency fact-finding and decisionmaking process."7 By contrast,
Judge Bazelon downplayed the likely net benefits of a court's
attempts to evaluate on the merits the substance of the agency's
complex, technical, scientifically informed judgments.'
Judge Bazelon thus argued that
in cases of great technological complexity, the best way for
courts to guard against unreasonable or erroneous
administrative decisions is not for the judges themselves to
scrutinize the technical merits of each decision. Rather, it is
to establish a decision-making process that assures a
reasoned decision that can be held up to the scrutiny of the
scientific community and the public.9
More concisely, Judge Bazelon concluded that "Ib]ecause
substantive review of mathematical and scientific evidence by
technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable, I continue
to believe we will do more to improve administrative decision-
making by concentrating our efforts on strengthening
administrative procedures." '
Judges, of course, are not required to confine the logic of
their approach to a case within some single carefully defined
philosophical doctrine. Even if we say that a judge is adopting a
form of reliabilism, not all forms of judicial reliabilism must
164. See, e.g., SIDGWICK, supra note 74, at 211-12.
165. See, e.g., SHAFER-LANDAU, supra note 69, at 262 (referring in particular to
"gullibility, lack of experience, brainwashing, morally impoverished upbringings, facile
thinking, etc.").
166. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring).
167. Id. at 66-68.
168. Id. at 66-67.
169. Id. at 66 (quoting his own concurring opinion in Int'l Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring)).
170. Id. at 67.
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conflict with judicial intuitionism. Perhaps reliabilism could, for
example, be used merely to help judges select between conflicting
intuitions. Reliabilism in such a case could look to the
circumstances under which an intuition arose, and might help a
judge to determine which intuition is more likely true.
On the other hand, a judge might seek to apply some
reliabilist test to evidence, arguments, inferences, or chains of
inferences, that are not mere intuitions. In a sense, that kind of
judicial reliabilism would thus not be entirely in the service of
judicial intuitionism. Perhaps some evidence obtained in
particular ways, for example, might on some reliabilist theory be
deemed more reliably arrived at and more likely true than
evidence obtained in other ways."'
The problem, though, is that every form of judicial
reliabilism must, at various crucial points, rely upon one or more
intuitions of its own. 72 This is so even if we assume that the
judicial reliabilism in question is being applied directly to
nonintuitions.173 Consider, for example, Judge Bazelon's judicial
reliabilism discussed briefly above. We can say that Judge
Bazelon's reliabilism prefers judicial review of agency compliance
with procedural requirements over more direct judicial review of
the substance of agency outcomes, logic, evidence, or policy.174 It
is inescapable that Judge Bazelon must somehow, at least
implicitly, decide when this prioritizing of procedural-over-
substantive review is and is not justified. And this inescapably
requires intuitive judgment. How technically complex must a
case be before this priority is invoked? What counts as technical
complexity? Is the prioritizing of review of agency procedure over
substance absolute? Why so? If not, how strong is the priority?
Does the strength of the priority vary? If so, depending upon
what?
171. It has been argued, for example, that "[als early as the eighteenth century
English courts rejected confessions 'forced from the mind by the flattery of hope or by the
torture of fear' as being inherently unreliable." Claudio Salas, Note, The Case for
Excluding the Criminal Confessions of the Mentally Ill, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 243, 257
(2004) (quoting DAVID M. NISSAM ET AL., LAW OF CONFESSIONS 4 (1985)).
172. See Markus Lammenranta, Reliabilism and Circularity, 56 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 111, 111-12 (1996) (asserting that reliabilism involves circular
reasoning because "[t]o be able to justify the conclusion, we must be justified in believing
the premises").
173. See id. (explaining how reliabilism employs circular reasoning); see also Sinnott-
Armstrong, supra note 65, at 28-29 (explaining why "reliability is not sufficient by itself
to make moral beliefs justified").
174. See supra text accompanying notes 166-70.
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How is the reviewing court to determine the boundary even
between procedural review and substantive review?175 Are all
forms of review of agency procedures of equal weight and value?
Are all agency procedures themselves of equal value in
contributing toward judicial confidence in the reasonableness of
the agency's result? Can agency "overkill" in some procedural
respects compensate for otherwise unduly casual procedures in
other respects? 7 ' In all cases?
These are but a few of the questions that a reliabilist in the
position of Judge Bazelon must logically address, even when not
directly addressing intuitions.'77 And it is fair to say that at some
point in the overall reliabilist decisional process-if not at every
point-Judge Bazelon must, at least as a humanly limited
judge, '78 rely on intuition.
C. Coherentism
Could a judge bypass any need to appeal to intuition by
giving up the quest for any rock-bottom, foundational,
hierarchically basic moral or legal truths bearing upon the case
at hand? There would thus be no unshakable underlying truth,
general or particular, from which other relevant truths might
then be inferred. 7 ' Our confidence in any judicial result would
175. Depending upon one's interests and purposes, a reviewing court might find an
unduly sketchy agency statement of the basis of a newly enacted rule to be objectionable
either substantively or procedurally, perhaps under 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). See, e.g.,
United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251-53 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that
a regulation promulgated by the FDA was procedurally erroneous and substantively
inadequate). See also the occasionally unclear boundary between substantive and
procedural review in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97-98, 101-05, 108 (1983) (reversing the D.C. Circuit Court's finding of
insufficient compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission in a nuclear power plant licensing case).
176. For an example focused in this respect largely on "substance," see Baltimore
Gas, 462 U.S. at 102-06 (overriding Judge Bazelon's logic, as applied, in this respect).
177. See, e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 65, at 28 (explaining that a reliabilist
views beliefs as justified because they result from reliable processes).
178. The best known alternative to humanly limited judges is a judicial Hercules of
superhuman abilities. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-30 (1977)
(offering an example of how a superhuman judge would approach difficult cases or
questions of law). Whether a judge who was not merely superhuman, but ideal in all
respects relevant to decisionmaking, would need recourse to judicial intuition quickly
becomes a question of greater interest to students of philosophy than of jurisprudence. See
id. (describing when an ideal judge would rely on factors such as policy or his own
convictions and preferences).
179. See R. George Wright, Cumulative Case Legal Arguments and the Justification
of Academic Affirmative Action, 23 PACE L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2002) (explaining that under
the coherentist approach, "no single belief is thought to be indubitable or otherwise
privileged" in the formation of knowledge but rather a compilation of beliefs and
experiences can produce knowledge).
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instead be a function of how well or poorly that result is
enmeshed in a network of mutually supportive relevant claims 1 0
No single claim would be taken as intuitively unshakable.
On such an approach, no single judicial result need have
been arrived at through an act of intuition. Yet we might have
confidence in any single element of the network of beliefs because
of its degree of "fit"-the density and variety of its relationships
with its local and more distant fellow elements of a web of
mutual, reciprocal support."2
On this "coherentist" approach, the focus is thus not on
isolated individual beliefs. Instead, "whether a belief is justified
depends on the other beliefs one holds," and those beliefs need
not be more basic beliefs.'83 Coherentist methodologies are found
in many philosophical18 ' and legal 8' contexts. The influence of
180. See id. at 4-5 (arguing that a belief may be established by "the somehow
combined force of a number of different items"); see also Laurence Bonjour, The Coherence
Theory of Empirical Knowledge, 30 PHIL. STUD. 281, 289 (1976) (explaining that one
criticism of the coherentist approach is that it leads to the notion that "beliefs are justified
only in terms of relations to other beliefs and to the system of beliefs").
181. See Wright, supra note 179, at 11.
182. By loose analogy, we might have some justified confidence that a complex,
highly interactive, low-black-square crossword puzzle grid was filled in correctly by
recognizing that each of the entered words is supported by, and supports, a variety of
other words, directly and more remotely, even if we do not see any of the crossword clues.
SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY 82 (1995) ("How reasonable one's confidence is
that a certain entry in a crossword puzzle is correct depends on... any intersecting
entries that have already been filled in.... ."). For development of a crossword puzzle
analogy in the context of epistemology, see id. at 81-89; Nancey Murphy, Truth,
Relativism, and Crossword Puzzles, 24 ZYGON 299, 303-06 (1989). The crossword puzzle
analogy may help with the objection that another name for reciprocal support is mere
vicious circularity of argument.
183. SHAFER-LANDAU, supra note 69, at 256.
184. See Wright, supra note 179, at 10-11 (observing that "[c]oherentist theories, as
the term is used by philosophers, vary in their description"); see also Bonjour, supra note
180, at 281 (exploring a coherence theory "which avoids all versions of foundationism");
Michael R. DePaul, Two Conceptions of Coherence Methods in Ethics, 96 MIND 463, 463
(1987) (noting that Rawls's method of reflective equilibrium "remains open to at least two
distinct interpretations which differ with respect to the kinds of revision of pre-
philosophical beliefs the method allows"); Michael Williams, Coherence, Justification, and
Truth, 34 REV. METAPHYSICS 243, 243 (1980) (analyzing whether "rejecting the
foundational view of knowledge commits us to some form of coherence theory" and
"whether rejecting all foundations is a step in the direction of idealism"); cf AUDI, supra
note 79, at 162 (noting the possible combination of "top-down" moral theorizing with
specific case-based, more intuitivist "bottom-up" moral theorizing).
185. See, e.g., ALAN H. GOLDMAN, MORAL KNOWLEDGE 188 (1988) (contending that
"[liegal arguments are purely coherentist, and the truth of statements such as 'x is liable'
lies in their coherence with other judgments of the same sort"); Ken Kress, Why No Judge
Should Be a Dworkinian Coherentist, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1375, 1375-76 (1999) (observing
that "coherentist methods permeate modern theories of law" and citing in particular the
legal coherentism of Ronald Dworkin); Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box:
Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 513-14 (2004)
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coherentism in theories of law and adjudication has of late been
substantial."s6
Courts sometimes deny that in deciding cases they work in
both directions, from evidence to conclusions, and at the same
time from (tentative) conclusions to (relevant) evidence and
findings. 7  Interestingly, courts occasionally describe their
reasoning not in formalist, facts-leading-to-conclusion terms, but
in backward-working terms. One court, for example, has argued,
Notwithstanding protestations on the part of countless
thousands of appellate judges during the course of
numerous centuries, legal reasoning in complex cases
inevitably works backward from the result to the rule
rather than from the rule to the result. For example,"substantial compliance," "intention of the drafters," "clear
and unambiguous," "unconscionability," and "constructive
fraud" are all legal phrases which can be used selectively to
arrive at any given result which suits the fancy of the
court.18
We should not casually assume that such an admission
should be interpreted as denying any "forward," findings-to-
conclusion movement in complex cases. Read strongly, the quoted
language actually seems to suggest a noncoherentist, exclusively
"backward" movement of judicial reasoning to rationalize a
predetermined, perhaps intuited, judicial result. Perhaps judicial
intuitionism is more useful-or more utterly indispensable-in
complex cases.
On the other hand, any defense of judicial intuitionism on
the merits would have to explain how judicial intuitions are
supposed to operate, properly, in cases that are assumed to be
quite complex.88 For the sake of the argument, then, we can at
least hold open the possibility of coherentist, multidirectional,
(discussing the coherentist model as both moving forward from premises or findings of
fact to the legal conclusions and at the same time moving "backward" from (tentative)
legal conclusions to adjust or establish the premises and findings, such that the
movement in either direction affects the movement in the other direction). But see Joseph
Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 273 & n.3 (1992) (describing
Dworkin as a coherentist in some senses, but not in others).
186. See, ,e.g., Kress, supra note 185, at 1375 (noting that "coherence has been a
pivotal.., explanatory and justificatory concept in theories of law and adjudication").
187. See RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 21 (1961) (positing that
the view "that the judge usually begins with the conclusion that he deems proper and only
later seeks to rationalize this result" is not unique).
188. Butcher v. Miller, 569 S.E.2d 89, 99 (W. Va. 2002) (Albright, J., concurring)
(quoting Bd. of Church Extension v. Eads, 230 S.E.2d 911, 917 (W. Vs. 1976)).
189. See WASSERSTROM, supra note 187, at 90-91, 95-96 (observing that the
procedure for reaching decisions based on intuition is difficult to verify and has not been
fully explained).
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web-like judicial reasoning. What does not seem realistic, though,
is judicial coherentism that avoids relying crucially on
intuitionism, in itself and as applied in any given case.9 0 It might
be that intuitionism provides the best defense for choosing a
coherentist method in the first place.'9 ' And there may well be
some cases, simple or complex, in which the judge first intuits
the right result, and only then applies coherentist methods to
confirm, or rationalize, the result.9 But we need not rely on
either of these possibilities in showing the inescapability of
intuitionism even for coherentist judges.
The most fundamental problem is that coherentism, along
with the idea of coherence itself, is merely a vague and general
idea, rather than a method of deciding cases, until it is clarified
or fleshed out.9 The process of clarification requires that a
number of choices be made.' These choices obviously cannot
follow from a fully specified coherentist theory; they must
precede and contribute to such a theory.'9 ' Coherentism itself
cannot tell us how to specify what should count as coherentism,
or as the best form of coherentism.
A judge who wants to apply coherentism must somehow
answer a number of crucial questions: Is there anything more to
coherence than mere logical consistency?'96 Over how broad an
area of the law should coherence be sought in any given case?
Coherence with all of the law? Or more modestly, with only the
apparently nearby, neighboring area of the laws? How should we
decide what counts as a "neighboring" area of the law? Should a
judge weigh into the ultimate decision an apparently substantial
incoherence with a "remote" area of the law? Should the
importance of the remote area of the law itself matter? Are
individual judges' decisions on such matters likely to be reliable?
190. See McMahan, supra note 63, at 100-01 (noting that under coherentism, even
though intuitions have no value standing alone, they may serve as the basis for what will
later become a unified set of principles).
191. See id. (describing "reflective equilibrium" and explaining that one may "begin
with a set of moral intuitions" and then gather principles that serve as justified moral
beliefs).
192. See Butcher, 569 S.E.2d at 99 (Albright, J., concurring) (suggesting that there
are legal phrases which are "designed to justify a desired result").
193. See Bonjour, supra note 180, at 288 (noting the "serious vagueness and
unclarity of the central conception of coherence").
194. See id. ("It is clear that coherence depends on the various sorts of inferential,
evidential, and explanatory relations which exist among the members of a set of
propositions . . .
195. See id.
196. See id. (noting that one essential point of the concept of coherence is that
"coherence is not to be equated with consistency").
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Judges will notice that a decision can be incoherent either
with some other specific legal judgment or with a more general
legal rule.'97 How should a judge decide which kind of incoherence
is more important, in general or in the given case? Could a
judgment be somehow incoherent with, but without actually
violating, a relevant statute or constitutional provision? Are
there degrees of coherence,'" but not of consistency?
Could conflicting judicial outcomes be equally coherent
overall, but based on their different degrees of coherence with
different parts of a body of case law? If so, how should decisional
ties-or at least ties as far as human judges can tell-be broken?
How should judges address the problem of a clear but noncrucial
incoherence versus an unclear but somehow more crucial
incoherence? Are a large number of instances of incoherence
enough to outweigh one especially important incoherence? How is
a judge to decide, especially absent a violation of a statute or
constitutional provision, whether an incoherence is important or
not? Must not judicial coherentism take a stand on, among other
concerns, the seriousness of various statutory and constitutional
violations?
These inescapable choices are not mere complications
thrown at a well-articulated judicial coherentism, but are instead
some of the choices that must be made in the course of arriving
at a meaningful judicial coherentism in the first place. Can we
possibly say that all of the above choices, along with others, are
strictly logically inferable from basic principles, where neither
those basic principles nor their interactive relationships is at all
a matter of intuition? If we have no grounds for believing that
articulating a judicial coherentism can be achieved merely
through inference from principles not intuitively grasped, we
should all admit the crucial role of intuition in developing and
applying judicial coherentism. 9' Without recourse to intuition,
we have no nonarbitrary sense of better and worse in answering
any of the questions posed above."0
197. See WASSERSTROM, supra note 187, at 77-78 (stating that rules of law should
not be blindly followed because of stare decisis but instead only become precedent after
numerous judges have determined the correctness of the rule).
198. See Bonjour, supra note 180, at 288 (noting that "coherence will obviously be a
matter of degree").
199. See McMahan, supra note 63, at 101 (observing that under coherentism,
intuitions are "potential sources of moral knowledge").
200. See id. at 98 (recognizing that there may be "a certain skepticism about whether
the norms and principles extracted from a moral theory with foundations wholly




Reasoning by analogy in the law is "exceedingly prominent,"
and perhaps "the most familiar form of legal reasoning." 01
Reasoning by analogy has even been linked closely to the idea of
truth or falsity among legal propositions."2 Thus one philosopher
has maintained that "[tihe truth of a proposition of law consists
in that proposition's being more analogous to those in the
previously settled body of law than is its denial.""'
Reasoning by analogy to reach judicial decisions may well
offer a number of arguable advantages over alternative ways of
proceeding.0 4 But our concern is not with anything like the actual
merits of judicial intuitionism or of any possible alternative.
Intuitionism may, for all we need argue herein, be somehow
fatally flawed. But if deciding cases by use of analogies itself
inescapably involves recourse to judicial intuition, as do the
several approaches referred to above in this Part,20 ' those who see
advantage in the use of analogies must confront an important
problem. If the analogical approach seems preferable to
intuitionism because, perhaps, intuitionism is said to be
mysterious, arbitrary, or incoherent, then the inescapable
dependence of the analogical method on intuitionism raises a red
flag. The advocate of judicial decisionmaking by analogy must
explain how, given the unavoidable dependency, the vices of
intuitionism can be compensated for, or neutralized, in judicial
decisionmaking by analogy.
The dependency of judicial decisionmaking by analogy on
intuitionism seems clear enough. We again see this by an
accumulation of unavoidable questions lacking plausible and
compatible alternative solutions. Perhaps most pointedly, we
must first ask any proponent of the analogical approach how we
know whether one case is relevantly more analogous than some
201. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV.
741, 741-42 (1993).
202. See id. at 742 (suggesting that analytical reasoning may provide insight into
determining the correctness of legal claims).
203. GOLDMAN, supra note 185, at 188 ("Legal arguments ... are
distinguished... from purely moral arguments by the independent, institutionally
established data base from which the relevant analogies and disanalogies must be
derived.").
204. See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 4 (1949)
("The [law] forum protects the parties and the community by making sure that the
competing analogies are before the court."); Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical
Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1186 (1999) (arguing, among other claims,
that "a diligent process of studying and comparing prior decisions produces a wealth of
data for decisionmaking").
205. See supra Part V.A-C (discussing inferentialism, reliabilism, and coherentism).
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other case to our own case."' How do we know a relevant
similarity or dissimilarity when we see one? Some such
similarities may be strictly inferable from others, but surely not
many of the most interesting.
Whether driving sixty miles per hour in a medical
emergency is more like driving sixty miles per hour from sheer
exuberance than like driving at the thirty-five miles per hour
posted speed limit is presumably a matter of judicial judgment
based on values, statutory or common law purposes, societal or
more narrowly public policies, or on someone's understanding of
moral permission and requirement more broadly. But precisely
which of these? And even if we were to concede that intuition
plays no role in choosing among these possibilities, applying the
chosen possibility in actual cases inevitably requires intuition.
Values, purposes, policies, and moral decisionmaking in general
will in practice present a number of problems of choice to the
adjudicator. What if one case is more similar to ours with regard
to some values, but another, conflicting case is more similar with
regard to other values? We might say that one value strictly
outranks another value.0 7 But does a very limited promotion of
the higher ranking value still outrank, or outweigh, a much more
substantial promotion of the lower ranking value? Intuition
again seems inescapable.
A judge might try to bypass what we could call inevitable
"intuition creep" by looking only to purely utilitarian
considerations in deciding all the questions prompted by the
analogical method of adjudication 8 But any attempt to combine
analogy in adjudication with maximizing utility must itself rely
on a number of moral intuitions.0 9 Utilitarianism itself is
properly recognized as little more than a name for a series of
largely intuitive choices one must make on the way merely to
specifying a reasonably clear and unambiguous utilitarian
206. See, e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING
83 (1985) (asserting that the issue in reasoning by analogy is to decide which "factual
similarities or differences between two cases will or should matter"); Richard Warner,
Note, Three Theories of Legal Reasoning, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1523, 1555 (1989) (critiquing
LEVI, supra note 204, by asking, "when and how does a court have an adequate
justification for thinking one case relevantly like another?" (emphasis omitted)).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 129-44.
208. Such a judge might be looking to utilitarianism to carry forward an underlying,
nonutilitarian commitment to the importance of analogy, or might believe instead that
carving out a role for analogical thinking in adjudication actually maximizes utility in
practice.
209. See David Lyons, The Moral Opacity of Utilitarianism, in MORALITY, RULES,
AND CONSEQUENCES 105, 105 (Brad Hooker et al. eds., 2000) (noting that there are
various objections to the claim that utilitarians need not rely on moral intuitions).
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theory."' The various choices one must make among competing
forms of utilitarianism obviously cannot themselves be made on
utilitarian grounds. Intuitions, largely of a moral sort, will be
required at every point.
To briefly summarize this Part, then, we have argued for the
practical inescapability of crucial reliance on intuition in case
adjudication. There are certainly a variety of possible
understandings as to how judges do in fact or ought to decide
cases. For their prominence, we have focused on theories of
adjudication that emphasize, respectively, the role of logical1 21121
inference, reliability of the decisionmaking process,212 coherence
of a judgment with other judgments or other legal and moral• ] .- 213
considerations, and analogy or relevant similarity in deciding
cases."' We have not suggested that intuitionism is actually
better or worse than any of these alternative approaches to
adjudication. Intuitionism, in general or as applied by judges,
may be incoherent, arbitrary, or somehow disadvantageous."'
But those who endorse any alternative theory must recognize
their own theory's dependence upon intuitions, and must then
somehow bypass or minimize the damage done to their own
theory by any defects of intuitionism.
The degree of damage done to alternative theories by their
inevitable incorporation of intuitionism may depend less on the
nature of the alternative theory than on the nature of the
assumed defects of intuitionism. If, for example, intuitionism is
thought to be completely incoherent, the damage done to
alternative theories that depend on intuitionism may be
substantial. A theory may be as weak as its weakest, or its least
coherent, element. But if intuitionism is instead thought merely
to be especially liable to abuse in some way, the damage may be
more fully avoidable. An alternative theory, for example, might
require a judicial intuition that is arguably merely subjective"' to
210. See id. (referring to a number of the choices that must be confronted in arriving
at any reasonably well-specified utilitarian theory).
211. See supra Part V.A.
212. See supra Part V.B.
213. See supra Part V.C.
214. See supra Part V.D.
215. See, e.g., Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 636-37 (1982) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (decrying the majority opinion as based on only judicial intuition rather than
Illinois law); Shaffer v. Farm Fresh, Inc., 966 F.2d 142, 145-46 (4th Cir. 1992) (requiring
stronger proof than mere judicial intuition to warrant disqualification of counsel); see also
supra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL
REASONING 86 (1998) ("The intuitionism with which [G.E. Moore] ends up is a blank wall.
This is because it goes with no epistemology (no way of distinguishing better or worse
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be checked against other intuitions of other judges with different
backgrounds. Or if intuitionism is thought to be biased in some
way, it may be possible for the incorporating theory to somehow
counteract or limit that bias.217
VI. CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL INTUITION, PRACTICAL WISDOM, AND
ARTICULATED JUDICIAL REASONING
Deciding judicial cases inescapably requires the exercise of
intuition. Judicial intuition cannot be reduced to an explicit
formula, or to an articulable process of decisionmaking. There is,
so to speak, more to the judicial decisionmaking process than
judges can articulate.21 Yet when courts decide controversial
questions, we often expect positive value in the court's oral or
written opinion accompanying its otherwise bare declaration of
the outcome. What value can really inhere in an articulated
judicial opinion, though, if the real decisionmaking process must
be largely inarticulable and opaque even to the actual
decisionmaker?
It is again not our claim that judicial intuitionism is superior
to its rivals, or even provably coherent.219 But we will argue in
this concluding section that the inarticulability that we find in
intuitionism is no more suspicious than the inarticulability we
consider normal in good judgment or practical wisdom in
general.22 ° The inarticulability in judicial intuitionism, and in
wise practical judgment generally, thus does not make judicial
opinion writing a valueless sham.
Judicial opinions, after all, need not pretend to render
transparent and explicit a decisionmaking process that is not
fully grasped even by the judge. A written judicial opinion can
still be authentic, meaningful, and valuable. Crucially, an
opinion accompanying an intuitionist outcome can itself amount
intuitions).").
217. In a somewhat similar fashion, it is sometimes thought that an historical
tendency toward racial legislation that is later recognized as unjust can be to some degree
counteracted by applying the judicial test of strict scrutiny, which in other contexts might
be an excessively rigid restriction on government policy. See generally Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227-31 (1995).
218. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 87 F.3d 676, 681 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting
that when judicial intuition provides the answer, it is usually preferable to simply
announce the conclusion, rather than "attempt to explicate its doctrinal basis").
219. See supra text accompanying notes 101-05.
220. See, e.g., Anthony Kronman, Practical Wisdom and Professional Character, 4
SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 203, 206-07 (1986) (discussing Aristotle's concept of practical wisdom
and explaining that "[slome men ... possess an understanding of particulars and others
lack it").
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to reasonable evidence that the judge has taken full, careful,
empathetic, and detailed account of all of the main interests and
concerns of the opposing and other affected parties. In this way, the
opinion can properly add to (or inadvertently undermine) the
persuasiveness and legitimacy of even an intuition-based outcome.
The exercise of sound judgment not reducible to rule is often
called for in judicial decisionmaking.22' There are many routine
cases that do not call for a judge with a distinctive capacity for
practical wisdom and sound judgment. This may be because the
case is easily and uncontroversially decided, and easily placed
within a standard structure of rules and precedents. But many
fairly complex and potentially controversial cases, with interesting
implications and consequences, call for judgment and practical
wisdom.
A common scenario along such lines was articulated by the
philosopher Bernard Williams:
It may be obvious that in general one kind of consideration is
more important than another... but it is a matter of
judgement whether in a particular set of circumstances that
priority is preserved: other factors alter the balance, or it may
be a very weak example of the consideration that generally
wins.
2 22
Deciding judicial cases thus cannot always, if ever, be a
mechanical or formulaic process. Sound practical judgment that is
no more articulable than intuition, if such sound practical judgment
even differs from intuition, will often be required.223
Sound practical judgment, as an aim, a skill, or as a character
trait, is part of the common aspiration of almost all persons.224 Much
of both the value and the limitations of such judgment was explored
221. See, e.g., Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 733, 740 (2004) (referring to the Greek concept of phronesis, translated as
practical wisdom). For more extended discussion of good judgment and practical wisdom
in the legal profession see generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING
IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993); Kronman, supra note 220; and R. George
Wright, Whose Phronesis? Which Phronimoi?: A Response to Dean Kronman on Law
School Education, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 817 (1996).
222. BERNARD WILLIAMS, MAKING SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 190 (1995). Sensitivity to circumstances, and especially to the possibility that
most morally relevant qualities might contribute positive moral value in some
circumstances, but negative moral value in other circumstances or contexts, is
emphasized by what is called 'moral particularism.' See generally MORAL PARTICULARISM
(Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little eds., 2000).
223. See, e.g., Worthy v. U.S. Steel Corp., 507 F. Supp. 25, 28 (E.D. Penn. 1980)
(finding that intent sometimes must be inferred using common sense and intuition).
224. Kronman, supra note 220, at 206-07 (noting that people turn to lawyers and
judges for guidance in hopes of benefiting from their practical wisdom).
20061 1421
1422 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [42:5
early on by Aristotle." 5 Aristotle thought of the person of practical
wisdom, or the phronimos, as capable not only of abstract logic, but
of applying accumulated experience and reflection while controlling
for biasing factors.126  The phronimos will not be able to
uncontroversially demonstrate the correctness of a given practical
judgment, so in this sense, some sort of public trust or confidence in
the phronimos is required.227 In the end, according to Aristotle, no
rigorous method, formula, calculus, or science "can replace careful
and sensitive judgement.""' Thus even Aristotle himself does not
claim to be able to rigorously explain how the phronimos arrives at
sound, practical-including moral and legal-judgments. 9 The
main positive assumption is instead that the community will be
able to somehow recognize such a distinctive person.23 °
The basic Aristotelian framework was carried forward
historically by Aquinas23 ' and developed in some ways by Edmund
Burke.23 ' But at a general level, the idea of inarticulable,
unexplainable, but sound practical judgment not constrained by
rule is now common intellectual property,2"' and is reflected in
225. Id. at 206 (describing Aristotle's description of "phronismos" [sic] as a man
whose understanding of particulars is developed to a high degree).
226. See NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER: ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF
VIRTUE 3, 123 (1989),
227. Id. at 54.
228. Id. at 85-86.
229. See LINDA TRINKAUS ZAGZEBSKI, DMNE MOTIVATION THEORY 44 (2004) (noting
that Aristotle "clearly is not confident that he can give a full account of" the nature of
phronesis).
230. See id.
231. See BERNARD LONERGAN, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, in 3
COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN 432 (Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran
eds., Univ. of Toronto Press 1992) (1957) (describing the approach of Aquinas as going
further than that of Aristotle by requiring judgment or wisdom to confirm and apply even
self-evident principles); see also 2 AQUINAS, supra note 69, Pt. II-II, Q. 47-60 (discussing
prudence and justice generally).
232. See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in THE
PORTABLE EDMUND BURKE 416, 451-52 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1999) (reflecting Burke's
distrust of abstract rationalizing in favor of accumulated, if partly inarticulable, embodied
wisdom).
233. See, for example, the work on inarticulable, not fully understood judgment in
action discussed under the rubric of "tacit knowledge" by MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1958). Consider also the
fascinating discussion and investigations presented in Hubert L. Dreyfus, What Is Moral
Maturity? A Phenomenological Account of the Development of Ethical Expertise, http://ist-
socrates.berkeley.edu/-hdreyfus/rtf/Moral_Maturity_8_90.rtf (last visited Jan. 12, 2006)
(discussing the nonrationalizability of intuitive expert judgments in several contexts).
Some of Dreyfus's themes are explored and developed in Joshua Greene & Jonathan
Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 6 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 517, 517
(2002) (finding moral reasoning, as opposed to affect-laden intuitions, to matter most in
contexts in which influencing others or reaching consensus with allies is a priority);
Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach
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common experience. And along with a sense of the mysteries, the
indispensability, and the arguable reality of sound practical
judgment, we have developed something of an understanding of the
traits, conditions, circumstances, and habits that often tend to
impair the exercise of sound practical judgment.
Sound judging is, for example, often thought to require what
might be called mental maturity.23 ' Our intuitions and judgments,
judicial and otherwise, may as well be adversely affected by "our
personal interests or habitual sympathies."23 Judgments may be
similarly adversely affected by hastiness or by a "lack of
thoughtfulness." '236 Our cultural socialization process may, of course,
skew as much as facilitate genuinely sound intuitive judgment.
Consider in particular Professor Peter Singer's suggestion "that all
the particular moral judgments we intuitively make are likely to
derive from discarded religious systems, from warped views of sex
and bodily functions, or from customs necessary for the survival of
the group in social and economic circumstances that now lie in the
distant past."237 The sound judge, presumably, displays the required
personal qualities, decides under appropriate conditions, and seeks
to somehow minimize or transcend the various distortive influences
on the exercise of genuinely sound intuitive judgment.
It would be tedious, if not impossible, for a judge to provide
overwhelming evidence in a judicial opinion of having met all of the
above positive and negative requirements, along with any other
requirements of good judging. 3' Yet the popular belief persists,
rightly, that key judicial decisions should be publicly justified,
beyond a mere dressing up of the bare results of judicial intuition.239
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCH. REV. 814, 814-15 (2001) (endorsing a social intuitionist as
opposed to a rationalist model of moral judgment in many, but not all, contexts).
234. See ROSS, supra note 66, at 12 (asserting that direct apprehension of self-
evident prima facie rightness of some kinds of acts requires "a certain degree of maturity,"
including "the development that takes place from generation to generation" as well as
"that which takes place from infancy to adult life"); see also Nelson, supra note 61, at 56-
57 (discussing Ross).
235. SIDGWICK, supra note 74, at 214.
236. H.A. PRICHARD, Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?, in MORAL WRITINGS,
supra note 66, at 7, 14 n.7; see also ALMOND, supra note 157, at 101-02 (discussing
Prichard on this point).
237. Peter Singer, Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium, 58 MONIST 490, 516 (1974);
Nelson, supra note 61, at 70.
238. What we look for in good judging, and what we assume leads to bad judging, as
discussed above, could be brought together in a reliabilist theory of good judging. See
supra Part V.B. Unfortunately, what counts as promotive of good or bad judging-as in
the area of emotion in general-may in some cases be controversial, and even when not
controversial, clearly dependent upon intuitional choice for its adoption and application.
See text accompanying notes 171-74.
239. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 HOUS. L.
REV. 1395, 1397 (2000) (suggesting that "a failure to provide reasons for a decision might
2006] 1423
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
Ideally, we would want an articulated account of why one legal
result was judged better by comparison with one or more
alternative legal results. But even if this is not fully realizable, we
want a public justification for the largely intuitive judgment that
reasonably persuades and does not merely rationalize or legitimize
by merely rhetorical means.2 4 0
Doubtless it will be difficult to reconstruct and present to the
public the authentic unbroken chain of reasoning, if any, associated
with one's intuitions, or an ultimately convincing justification for
one's judicial intuitions as one actually experienced them.24 ' But the
mystery of one's intuitive legal conclusion is one thing, and
persuasively justifying that conclusion in at least a loose or broad
sense is something different.242 A reasonably perceptive and
articulate intuitionist judge should be able to offer some sort of
genuinely relevant defense of the judge's intuitions.
Even if a judge somehow merely intuits the wrongness of, say,
inflicting pain on an animal merely for the tormentor's own casual
amusement, the intuition presumably would not occur without the
judge noticing or assuming what most of us would take to be
morally or legally relevant facts and circumstances, including
sensitivities, vulnerabilities, biological laws, motivations, effects on
character, and so on. And in a similar way, Justice Stewart may
have intuited the nonobscenity of the material in Jacobellis24' on the
basis of a wide range of relevant circumstances, perceptions, and
experiences, as well as the nature and effects of the specific
material at issue.244 All of these considerations can be referred to in
a written judicial opinion.
actually undermine the Court's ability to function effectively as a judicial institution").
240. Cf id. at 1397 ("The opinions of the Supreme Court are at times said to confer
legitimacy on the decisions to which the opinions appertain."). By contrast with our
approach, Prichard's famous moral intuitionism, see supra note 236, argued that we
should not attempt to add independent moral reasoning to our particular moral
judgments, which are said by Prichard to rest instead on immediate intuitive
apprehension. See Nelson, supra note 61, at 56.
241. See SHAFER-LANDAU, supra note 69, at 252.
242. See, e.g., WASSERSTROM, supra note 187, at 27 (comparing the "process of
discovery" and the "process of justification"); see also Frederick Schauer, Opinions As
Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1463 (1995) (discussing the role of a judicial opinion as
teaching, explaining, or persuading the public). There is a narrow sense of the idea of
explaining-in the sense roughly of putting an idea in simpler words-in which,
admittedly, an intuited judicial outcome cannot, strictly, be explained. Nor, in a strict
sense, can judges offer genuine reasons for an intuited judicial outcome, if we take giving
reasons to always involve moving to a higher level of generality. See Frederivk Schauer,
Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 638-39 (1995). But there is for our purposes no
reason to confine the idea of judicially justifying an outcome so narrowly.
243. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
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